


Contradictions in Current European Security Policy

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- **Objective 1:**
 - Promotion of IT-security
 - Protection of critical infrastructures
 - Protection of networks
 - Protection of the integrity of IT-systems

- **Objective 2:**
 - Public security
 - IT-based measures
 - Telecommunications data retention
 - Online search on IT-Systems

- **Requirements of international law:**
 - Convention of Cybercrime, signed 23.11.2001 by member states of the Council of Europe
 - Also signed by the non-member states:
 - Japan
 - United States of America
 - Canada
 - South Africa
 - Available:
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm>

- **States are obliged to ensure the punishability of:**
 - Illegal access to a computer system (Art. 2)
 - Illegal interception of non public transmissions of computer data (Art. 3)
 - Data and system interference by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, altering or surpressing computer data without right (Art. 4 and 5)

- **Article 6 – Misuse of devices**
- **States are obliged**
 - to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally and without right:
 - the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of:
 - a device, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing offences (Art. 2 through 5)
 - a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed
 - with intent that it will be used for the purpose of committing offences Art. 2 through 5

▪ IT-security aspects:

- This article shall not be interpreted as imposing criminal liability where the production..., or otherwise making available or possession
 - is not for the purpose of committing an offence established in accordance with Articles 2 through 5 of this Convention, such as for the **authorised testing or protection of a computer system.**

- **Difference between:**
 - Hacker tools
 - Important for the qualification:
 - Intended use: committing offences
 - Dual use tools
 - Not intended for committing offences, but applicable for misuse
 - Informations about zero-day exploits?
 - Tools for account probes?
 - ??? - Intent of the user!
- **Not implemented: Exception Art. 6, IT-sec.**

- **Punishability of pentesting?**
 - Solutions for the problem:
 - Prior written consent of the owner
 - Documentation

- **Punishability of password security checks?**
 - Solutions for the problem:
 - Stipulation in the provider agreement
or
 - Acceptance by the user

- **Punishability of exchange of informations about vulnerabilities?**
 - No punishability if the aim of the activity is the protection of computer systems (exception)
 - Indicated by:
 - Profession (IT-security professionals)
 - Objectives (white hat)
 - Additional recommendation:
 - Agreement between the parties of information exchange > Only use for legal purposes!

- **Telecommunications data retention**
 - Stated by the Directive 2006/24/EC
 - Also planned in the USA
 - Obligation for access providers:
 - Collecting data about telecommunication (phone, internet, e-mail)
 - Persons, time, ip-adresses...
 - Except the content of conversations and communications
 - Storage time at least 6 month
 - On demand: forwarding to security authorities
 - No use for own (providers) purposes allowed

▪ Pros

- Additional chance of identifying criminal offenders in the Internet
- Chance to find and monitor potential terrorists

▪ Cons

- Applies on the communication data of nearly all citizens
 - Costs / effectiveness?
 - Negative effects for civil rights

- **Vast amounts of stored data in database**
 - Risk of fraudulent use by the providers
 - Attractive target for attacks
 - Risk: law contains no unique guidelines for security concepts of data storage
- **Alternative solution:**
 - Storage by a central institution of the security authorities
 - Logging of demands
 - Supervision by parliament (checks and balances)

- **Part of the anti-terrorism legislation in:**
 - Germany
 - Latvia
 - Slovenia

- **Secret infiltration on IT-systems by authorised security agencies**
 - Live search and observation
 - Without house search and physical control
 - Without knowledge of the owner

- **Problem: implementation**
- **Necessary: backdoor penetration that allows the unnoticed access to data files**
 - Accomplished by installation of backdoor software
 - By specially designed vulnerabilities
 - By using specially designed backdoors in commercial software
 - By using not published zero-day exploits

- **Objective of promotion of IT-Security and**
- **Secret infiltration: Governmental interest in vulnerability of IT-systems**
 - Danger of misuse by criminals for cyberattacks!
 - Backdoors in commercial software
 - Informations about unpublished zero-day exploits
- **Solutions:**
 - Manual installation
 - Special designed vulnerabilities

- **Contradictions between the objectives**
 - IT-security < > public security
 - Solution: more considerateness by legislator

- **Contradictions inside the objective IT-security**
 - Pentesting
 - Password security checks
 - Informations about vulnerabilities
 - Solution: measures to mitigate the risk of punishability

Thanks for your attention!

Questions?

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