IT Security @ EC

Challenges & Experiences

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DG Informatics
European Commission

European Commission

Context

What we do

Experiences

1. Context

The 2020 Challenges

EU Policies (Lisbon Treaty)

EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCES

- *Customs Union*
- *Competition*
- *Monetary*
- *Marine resources*
- *Commercial policy*
- *International agreements (AETR)*

SHARED COMPETENCES

- ***internal market***
- *social*
- *cohesion*
- *agriculture and fisheries (except where exclusive)*
- *environment*
- *consumer protection*
- *transport*
- *trans-European networks*
- *energy*
- ***freedom, security and justice***
- *public health*
- *research and technological development*
- *space*
- *development cooperation*
- *humanitarian aid*

SUPPORT ACTIONS

- *Human Health*
- *Industry*
- *Culture*
- *Tourism*
- *Education, vocational training, youth and sport*
- *Civil protection*
- ***Administrative cooperation***

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Smart

developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation

Sustainable

promoting a more efficient, greener and more competitive economy

Inclusive

fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion


European Commission
Union for Innovation
Youth on the move
Digital Agenda for Europe
2010-2020
Efficient use of resources
Industrial policy
New qualifications & jobs
EU Platform against poverty
Europe 2020

European Commission

Trust & Security

Digital”

Neelie Kroes


Digital Single Market


Interoperab. & standards


Trust & security



Very fast Internet


Research & Innovation


Enhancing e-skills


ICT for social challenges

2. What we do

Trust and Security Policies

The 3 policy angles



Internet security: the EU Policy

*Focus on **prevention, resilience and preparedness** (complementary to fighting **cyber crime**)*

*Take into account the **civilian** & **economic stakeholders'** role and capability (role of private sector & the **governance challenge**)*

*Make **security and resilience the frontline of defence***

*Adopt an **all-hazards approach***

*Develop a **risk management** culture in the EU*

*Focus on the role socio-economic **incentives***

*Promote **openness, diversity, interoperability, usability, competition** as inherent security safeguards*

*Boost a global **collaborative policy** and **operational cooperation** across the EU, in particular on CIIP*

DAE. Pillar 3

KA 6 (28)

1. ENISA
   Regulation for mandate and duration
2. ToolBox
   - ENISA .....
   - EFMS .....
   - EP3R .....
   - Observer in Cyberstorm .
   - EPCIIP .....
   - CIIP Conference
3. EU institutions CERT
   Expert Group



- Critical Infrastructure Protection
- International Cooperation

Digital Agenda Key Action 6

"Present in 2010 measures aimed at a reinforced and high level Network and Information Security Policy, including … measures allowing faster reactions in the event of cyber-attacks, including a ***CERT for the EU institutions****."*

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Knowing better
Knowing together

Assist MS and EU Institutions in collecting, analysing and disseminating NIS data
(regularly assess NIS in Europe)

enisa
European Network and Information Security Agency

Working better
Working together

Provide assistance, support and expertise to the Member States and the European institutions and bodies
(cross border issues, detection and response capability, Exercises, etc.)

Cooperating better
Cooperating together

Facilitate cooperation, dialogue and exchange of good practice among public and private stakeholders
(risk management, awareness, security of products, networks and services, etc)

CIIP Communication. Actions

"Achievements and next steps: towards global cyber-security". COM(2011)163

Prevention	Detect & respond	Mitigate & recovery	Critical Infrastructure	International cooperation
Support cooperation National CERTs	European Information Sharing and Alert System (citizens and SMEs)	MS to develop national contingency plans European-wide exercises Reinforced cooperation between CERTs	Criteria to identify European critical infrastructures in ICT	→

International Cooperation (IC)

Internet resilience and stability	•European principles and guidelines for Internet resilience and stability developed within EFMS
Global cyber-incident exercises	•7 EU MS took part in US exercise Cyber Storm III (EC and ENISA observers)
Internet resilience and stability	•Discuss and promote the principles at the international level – bilaterally and in multilateral fora (G8, OECD, NATO, OSCE, Meridian, ASEAN,…)
Global cyber-incident exercises	•EC and US are developing, under EU-US WG on Cyber-security and Cyber-crime, a common programme and roadmap towards joint/synchronised trans-continental cyber exercises in 2012/2013

Information security @ EC



Target for multiple threats

Policy framework

- *Regulation (EC)45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data*
- *Commission provisions on security for classified information (2001/844/EC) to:*
  - **Define rules to follow (Legal requirements)**
  - **To exchange (classified) data between partners (Member states, Institutions, other governmental organizations), in confidence, since it is mandatory to share similar rules, mutually recognized**
- *Commission Decision C(2006)3602 concerning the security of information systems used by the European Commission*
- *EC internal security rules*
- *Similar regulation exists in the other institutions with equivalent principles (ex: Council Decision 5775/01)*

3. Experiences

European Commission

Climate Action
Energy for a Changing World

EU Emissions Trading Scheme

European Commission

www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jan/23/carbon-trading-scheme-security-delay

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Environment › Emissions trading

Carbon fraud may force longer closure of EU emissions trading

EU emissions trading scheme may remain suspended as governments struggle to beef up security

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Terry Macalister and Tim Webb
guardian.co.uk, Sunday 23 January 2011 19.08 GMT

Article history

The chimneys of Belchatow Power Station, Europe's largest biggest coal-fired power plant. European carbon trading was due to restart on Wednesday but may be delayed further after a £28m fraud Photograph: Peter Andrews/REUTERS

Hopes that a key tool in the fight against climate change can be brought back into full operation on Wednesday were fading as national

Environment
Emissions trading

Business

World news
European commission · European Union

UK news

More news

More on this story

UK nets €1bn in carbon permit auctions
Revenues could bring in billions for the government each year,

76,5 billion €

(CO_2 EU market value)

A rough ride?


November - December
Incidents in 2 Member States
19 January
Transactions temporarily suspended in all ETS registries
April
All registries back online
30 January
Single EU registry activated for aircraft operators
2010
2011
2012
14-17 January
Incidents in 3 additional MS
New version
Minimum security requirements agreed - cooperation EC and Member States
October
New successful attack in one MS

ETS. Response

Two-factor authentication

"Out of band" confirmation of transactions

Introduction of a trusted account list

Obligatory 4-eyes principle

Transfers initiated only at some time periods

Strengthening of know your customer checks for account holders and their representatives

New account categories

New hosting infrastructure and services

- **Monitoring services**
- **Software security testing**
- **Security incident management procedure**

EC as a target ….. a real case

News

European Commission hit by cyberattack

By Jennifer Baker

March 24, 2011 12:50 PM ET

IDG News Service - The European Commission, including the body's diplomatic arm, has been hit by what officials said Thursday was a serious cyberattack.

The attack was first detected on Tuesday and commission sources have said that it was sustained and targeted.

External access to the commission's e-mail and intranet has been suspended and staff have been told to change their passwords in order to prevent the "disclosure of unauthorized information," according to an internal memo to staff. Staff at the commission, the European Union's executive and regulatory body, have also been told to send sensitive information via secure e-mail.

European Commission

A Real APT targeted at EC




European Commission
Kernel
User land
Windows startup
Launch
L1: reboot persistence
Decrypt and load
L2: malware loader
Decrypt and load
L3: kernel orchestrator
Decrypt & load
L4: User land orchestrator
Load
Decrypt and load
Load
Decrypt and load
L3: core modules
•Virtual file system
•Encryption
•Compression
•System data collector
•Process scheduling
•Hooking engine
•L4 loader
•Kernel/user land communication
L4: kernel modules
•Middleware
•Stealth engine
•Executable loader
•User land interface
•Network sniffer
•Network firewall
L4: core modules
•Virtual file system
•Encryption
•Compression
•Strong cryptography
•Network communications
•File manager
•Object manager
•Windows startup manager
•Windows service manager
•Middleware
L4: user land modules
•Network protocols helpers
•Network sniffer
•SSL manager
•Object manager
•Directory & file manager
•Program instrumentation
•Impersonation
•Self-defence
•System data collector
•Password & secret collector
•Exchange mailbox collector
•Mail parser
Service oriented architecture rootkit



What we have learnt
1. Strategy



EC needs to constantly improve its security policy framework AND is implementing a cyber-defence program with several pillars:

- *Improve prevention measures dynamically based on lessons learnt from security incidents (post-mortem analysis is a key driver for security)*
- *Improve operational security capabilities*
  - **Vulnerability management program to proactively manage known vulnerabilities and weaknesses**
  - **Security monitoring → identify low signals of compromise**
  - **Incident response capabilities and cooperation (information exchange and assistance): live forensics, reverse engineering, networking**

And … get back to basics:

- *Review security posture (user rights, changes in configuration, deviations from baselines)*
- *Harden, harden, harden*
- *Improve privileged users practices*
  - **Use administration networks and hardened workstations for systems management**
  - **Use strong authentication for any privileged users activities**
- *Segregate critical infrastructre assets and monitor network and system behavior*
- *Use Secure coding practices (OWASP top 10 …)*

The positive feedback loop for continuous improvement



Vulnerability management:

- *Vulnerability watch: Alerts and warnings + advisories performed by CERT-EU for most common technologies, completed internally*
- *Mandatory Vulnerability assessment activities before going in production (proportional to system criticality*
  1) White-box testing
  2) White-box + Black box testing
  3) White-box + Black-box + penetration testing
- *Regular testing of infrastructure components (vulnerability assessment + technical compliance)*

European Commission

The sooner the better !



Peripheral security insufficient … Test Test Test … !

White Box tests (Static)

- Automatic source code scanning
- Manual revision to avoid false positives
- Support for all recommended languages (ex: Java, CF…)
- More vulnerabilities detected

Black Box tests (Dynamic)

- No source code required, no specific language
- Requires working application target (closest to PROD)
- Automatic + manual testing
- Complement to White Box testing and Penetration tests

Feedback from the front…



Findings on 1st ITERATION

	Iteration					
Vulnerability group	1	2	3	4	5	6
Cross-Site Scripting	43	14	2	2	1	1
Injection	23	6	1	0	1	
Insecure Transmission of credentials/tokens	10	3				
Password Management	13	6	2			
Cookie Security	9	7				
Path Manipulation	3	2	1	1		
Weak authentication	4	2				
Open redirect	5					
Logging of credentials	2	1				
Cross-Site Request Forgery	16	4	1	1		
Header Manipulation	15	3	1			
Weak cryptography	14	2	1			
File Upload	8	3	1	1		
Forced Browsing	7	2		1		
Log Forging	6	1	1	1		
Information disclosure	4	3			2	

Improvements over iterations



What we have learnt

2. React early

Security monitoring:

- *Focus on critical (infrastructure) assets*
- *Monitor security components at all levels (network layer, system and end-point protection, AV…)*
- *Focus on identifying low signals: changes in behaviour (network and system level)*
- *Use existing technologies (Proxies, IDS, NBA …) for cyber defence purpose (specific signatures/patterns)*
- *Establish strong synergies between Security Operations Centre and Incident Response Capability/Team*

Security Operations Centre

Technical

- **SIEM**
  - real-time analysis (filtering, correlation, analysis, reporting/dashboards)
  - Log preservation (forensics investigation)
- **Security solutions**
  - IDS, Network Behaviour Analysis, Vulnerability management, e-discovery, compliance …
- **Data feeds**
  - Critical assets (network, operating systems, Databases, middleware, applications, user identities)

Human

- Exchange of intelligence information with cyber-defence partners
- Information gathered during attacks, analysis (system and network forensics, reverse engineering, signatures)
- Content engineering skills (defining efficient detection scenarios)
- Technical and analytical skills

Security Incident Management:

- *Technical skills and toolkits (live-forensics, reverse engineering, and lot more)*
- *Personal skills (manage complex issues, many parallel activities, see the big picture, manage relations …over long periods …)*
- *Processes and procedures*
- *Cooperation and Networking with community (Trust, exchange of practices and information, assistance)*

The real challenges

- *Resources !!! Funding, increase it on demand …*
- *Scarcity of skilled resources*
- *Increasing complexity of (some) attacks*
- *Security IT landscape: cloud/virtualisation, mobility/BYOD*

Security is about risk management :
the challenge is to find the right balance