


CYBER FORTRESS ENTERPRISE



CYBER FORTRESS
ENTERPRISE




COMCERT

Agenda

- I. 13:30 – 13:45 Game History
- II. 13:45 – 14:10 Introduction (concept, navigation, rules)
- III. 14:10 – 14:50 1st Game Session
- IV. 14:50 – 15:00 Summary of the 1st Game Session
- VI. 15:00 – 15:30 Coffee Break
- VII. 15:30 – 15:45 Introduction (2nd Game Session)
- VIII. 15:45 – 16:35 2nd Game Session
- IX. 16:35 – 16:45 Summary of the 2nd Game Session
- X. 16:45 – 16:50 The Cyber Fortress Enterprise
- XI. 16:50 – 17:00 Results & Rewards

History



History

Premiere 2019 – Polish Naval Academy, Summer Cybersecurity School



History

Hybrid version 2021



History

<https://youtu.be/aPEZUnKSaEI>



Cyber Fortress

Cyber Fortress is a strategic simulation game which main idea and the task is to build the best cybersecurity system to prevent players' organizations against the most likely threats and to effectively react during the incident mitigation phase

Safeguards represent cybersecurity measures that come from four main areas:

organizational
(CERT, SOC team, ...)

procedural
(incident response procedure, ...)

technical
(SIEM, anty-DDoS, ...)

data sources



Cyber Fortress

Cyber Fortress is based on:

- VERIS Framework (<http://veriscommunity.net/>)
- MITRE ATT&CK Framework (<https://attack.mitre.org/>)
- Bow-Tie Risk Assessment model
- Defense-in-Depth model



CYBER FORTRESS
ENTERPRISE

Cyber Fortress - VERIS Framework

VERIS Framework - a dictionary for recording events and sharing event information, a set of metrics designed to provide a common language for describing security events in a structured and repeatable way.

Kick-off: **2010 r.**

Project sites:

- <https://github.com/vz-risk/veris>
- <http://veriscommunity.net/>



Cyber Fortress – MITRE ATT&CK Framework


MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge) Framework (<https://attack.mitre.org/>) - a structured, globally accessible knowledge base of tactics, techniques and procedures that are used by attackers, continuously updated and developed by a community of cyber security professionals.

The ATT&CK knowledge base is used as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies in the private sector, in government, and in the cybersecurity product and service community.

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
22 Items	21 Items	16 Items	22 Items	18 Items	22 Items	19 Items	17 Items	12 Items	8 Items	21 Items
Drive-by Compromise	Apprentice	Auth_profile and Authn	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Apprentice	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMETP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Feeding	Event History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Hardware Addition	Command-Line Interface	AppCert DLLs	AppCert DLLs	BTFS Jobs	Event Hooks	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encryption	Connection Proxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Dynamic Data Exchange	Apprent DLLs	Apprent DLLs	Access User Account Control	Clipboard Contents	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Exfiltration of Remote Services	Data from Information Repositories	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Searchsploit	Execution through API	Application Whiskering	Application Whiskering	Clear Command Prompts	Clipboard Contents	File and Directory	Logon Scripts	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Attachment	Execution through Module Load	Authentication Package	System User Account Control	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	Free the Beach	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding
Searchsploit Link	Exploitation for Client Execution	Browser Extensions	Dylib Hijacking	Hooking	Hooking	Hooking	Free the Toilet	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation
Searchsploit via Service	Credential User Interface	Change Default File Association	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Image File Execution Options Injection	Image File Execution Options Injection	Image File Execution Options Injection	Generic Execution Protocol	Data Register	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting
Supply Chain Compromise	Install	Component Firmware	File System Permissions Weakness	Launch Daemon	Launch Daemon	Launch Daemon	Generic Services	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Fallback Channel
Trusted Relationship	Launch	Component Object Model Hijacking	File System Permissions Weakness	New Service	New Service	New Service	Justification Through Immovable Media	Input Capture	Multi-Use Proxy	Multi-Stage Channel
Valid Accounts	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	Shared Network	Man in the Browser	Multiband Communication	Multilayer Encryption
	LSASS Driver	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Hooking	Image File Execution Options Injection	Image File Execution Options Injection	Image File Execution Options Injection	Web Hijacking	Screen Capture	Port Knocking	Remote Access Tools
	Malle	Dylib Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	Launch Daemon	Launch Daemon	Launch Daemon	Third-party Software	Video Capture	Remote File Copy	Standard Application Layer Protocol
	PowerShell	External Remote Services	Launch Daemon	New Service	New Service	New Service	Windows Admin Shares		Standard Cryptographic Protocol	Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol
	Regsvr32/Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	Windows Remote Management		Uncommonly Used Port	Web Service
	Regsvr32	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				
	RunDll32	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				
	Scheduled Task	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				
	Scripting	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				
	Service Execution	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				
	Signed Script Proxy Execution	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				
	Source	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				
	Source after Firmware	Hidden Files and Directories	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness				


Cyber Fortress – MITRE ATT&CK Framework

Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs) define the specific behaviors and tools used by cybercriminals or cybercrime groups to achieve their goals at each stage of an attack. Knowing the modus operandi of attackers who are potentially motivated to attack us, we can better prepare to defend ourselves and detect the attack.




tactics = goal
technique = way of achieving the goal
procedure = way to implement the technique

Cyber Fortress - Bow-Tie



Cyber Fortress - Defense-in-Depth

Defense-in-Depth - multi-level defense strategy - a way of designing the security of information systems, involving the introduction of multiple independent levels of security.




Practical information

- PC or phone, Chrome/Firefox/Safari browser (private mode)
- Internet access
- If during the game, something goes wrong - RELOAD webpage
- You will play 2 Games (3 Scenarios)
- Logging into the game is done with a PIN code
- **ONLY the team Captain logs into the game**
- The game consists of Events (Injects)
- Events could be Informational, Positive and Negative in nature
- In the Briefing section you will find the most important information about the Scenario
- Safeguards are divided into 8 categories (Organization, Physical infrastructure, Entire network, Network edge, Internal network, Host, Applications and Data)
- **There is a ninth category of Safeguard - Data Sources - which must be unlocked by purchasing the correct safeguard from the other eight categories**
- Some safeguards will not work unless they had been bought before the first Inject occurred
- Some safeguards will not work unless they had been bought before the Inject occurred
- You can find the list of Safeguards with description at:
<https://cyberfortress.comcert.pl/safeguards>



<https://cyberfortress.comcert.pl/safeguards>

Interface of the Game



Interface of the Game



Cyber Fortress - Introduction

Link to the Cyber Fortress Game:

<https://cyberfortress.comcert.pl/>



**The Game
requires a PIN
number to log
you into the
Lobby**



1ST GAME SESSION: The Energy System Attack




The Energy System Attack Scenario

On 23 December 2015, hackers using the BlackEnergy 3 malware remotely compromised information systems of three energy distribution companies in Ukraine and temporarily disrupted the electricity supply to consumers. Most affected were consumers of Prykarpattiaoblenergo (Ukrainian: Прикарпаттяобленерго; servicing Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast): 30 substations (7 110kv substations and 23 35kv substations) were switched off, and about 230,000 people were without electricity for a period from 1 to 6 hours.


At the same time, consumers of two other energy distribution companies, Chernivtsioblenergo (Ukrainian: Чернівціобленерго; servicing Chernivtsi Oblast) and Kyivoblenergo (Ukrainian: Київобленерго; servicing Kyiv Oblast) were also affected by a cyberattack, but at a smaller scale. According to representatives of one of the companies, attacks were conducted from computers with IP addresses allocated to the Russian Federation.

The Scenario has been based upon Events described above.



1. Reconnaissance – 2014 or earlier
2. Resource Development –
Develop Capabilities: Malware (BE3)– 2014 or earlier
- 3. Initial access - Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment –
May 2014- June 2015**
4. Execution - User Execution: Malicious File- May 2014-
June 2015
5. Command and control Application Layer Protocol:
Web Protocols - May 2014- June 2015
6. . Execution - Exploitation for Client Execution - June
2015- December 2015
7. Credential Access - Credentials from Password Stores:
Credentials from Web Browsers, Keylogging, Network
Sniffing, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory- June
2015- December 2015
8. Discovery – Account discovery, Remote system
discovery - June 2015- December 2015
Lateral Movement – Remote services - June 2015-
December 2015
- 9. Initial Access – External remote services**
Lateral movement – Valid accounts, External remote
services

Source: When the lights when out – ukrainian attack report



- 10. Resource Development – Develop Capabilities: Malware (KillDisk)– June 2015- December 2015
CORPORATE NETWORK
- 11. Lateral Movement – Lateral Tool Transfer- May 2014- June 2015
- 12. Execution – Scheduled Task- December 2015
ICS NETWORK
- 13. . Execution – Graphical User Interface- 23 December 2015
- 14. Persistence – System Firmware - 23 December 2015
CORPORATE NETWORK
- 15. Impact – Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood- 23 December 2015
- 16. Impact – Service Stop- 23 December 2015
Lateral Movement – Remote services - June 2015- December 2015
ICS NETWORK
- 17 . Impact– Data destruction

Source: When the lights when out – ukrainian attack report



The Energy System Attack Scenario

Link to the Cyber Fortress Game:

<https://cyberfortress.comcert.pl>

(the Team Captain ONLY)

list of Safeguards with description:

<https://cyberfortress.comcert.pl/safeguards>



The Game Session will last for: 40 min


Budget:

\$ 2 500 000




1ST GAME SESSION: The Energy System Attack EFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS

The Energy System Attack Scenario 1



The Energy System Attack Scenario 2

Threat actors conduct internal reconnaissance on corporate network to discover potential targets and expand access.




57 Configuration Management Database System (CMDB) \$48,000

77 Command Execution \$5,000

135 Process Creation \$5,000

Threat actors use stolen credentials to gain access and conduct reconnaissance on deployed systems.




30 Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) 85 000 USD

43 Privileged Access Management (PAM) System. \$280,000

49 Workstation protection system (End Point Security) \$88,800

Attackers deliver KillDisk malware to network share and set policy on DC to retrieve malware and execute upon system reboot.




11 Separation of Network Resources 172 000 USD

41 IDS/IPS -Intrusion Detection and Prevention System \$165,000

63 Active Directory Object Modification 5000 USD

Threat actors schedule unauthorized outage of UPS for telephone communication server and data center servers.



57 Configuration Management Database System (CMDB) \$48,000

43 Privileged Access Management (PAM) System. \$280,000

139 Scheduled Job Creation 5000 USD

ORGANIZATION

PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

ENTIRE NETWORK

NETWORK EDGE

INTERNAL NETWORK

HOST


APPLICATIONS

DATA

DATA SOURCES



The Energy System Attack Scenario 2



ORGANIZATION

PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

ENTIRE NETWORK

NETWORK EDGE

INTERNAL NETWORK

HOST

APPLICATIONS

DATA

DATA SOURCES




2ND GAME SESSION: WEBSITE DEFACEMENT & RANSOMWARE SCENARIOS

INTRODUCTION

Website Defacement Scenario - 0-day (vulnerabilities)


Vulnerabilities (security vulnerabilities are flaws in a computer system that weaken the overall security of the device/system.

0-day vulnerabilities are those that the manufacturer or user of the software or system does not know about



Website Defacement Scenario - 0-day (vulnerabilities)

Log4Shell Timeline



Website Defacement Scenario - Replacing site content

Website Defacement is an attack on a website that changes its appearance or content.





Websites in the gov.ua domain were compromised (as of January 14, 2022):

- Government services portal "Diia" - diia.gov.ua
- Cabinet of Ministers - kmu.gov.ua
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs - mfa.gov.ua
- State Rescue Service - dsns.gov.ua
- Ministry of Education and Science - mon.gov.ua
- Ministry of Youth and Sport - sport.gov.ua
- Ministry of Energy - mpe.kmu.gov.ua
- Ministry of Agrarian Policy - minagro.gov.ua
- Ministry of Veterans Affairs - mva.gov.ua
- Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Resources - mepr.gov.ua
- State Treasury Service - treasury.gov.ua

<https://csirt-mon.wp.mil.pl/pl/articles6-aktualnosci/analysis-cyberattack-ukrainian-government-resources/>

Website Defacement Scenario - Replacing site content

Defacement is an attack on a website that changes its appearance or content.



Wh00ps! - *Stoupid!*

- Hellow Goverment Polandia! -

Did you know about the issue in Indonesia related to the hacking carried out by Bjorkanism?.
To the Polandia Government please for the existence of Bjorka is he Polandia?
If Bjorka's presence is in Poland & what is the intent and purpose of hacking Indonesian state documentation and distributing it publicly in open forums?!


t.me/stoupidhack

#Indonesia#Hackers#Rulez

Wh00ps! - *Stoupid* - Mc'Sl0vv - ./FellGans - ZakSec166 - Atengg377


Ransomware Scenario

Types of malware




Ransomware Scenario

How Ransomware Works




Ransomware Scenario



<https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/phishing-apt-advanced-persistent-threats/>

Ransomware Scenario





2ND GAME SESSION: WEBSITE DEFACEMENT & RANSOMWARE SCENARIOS



Website Defacement Scenario

You are a government organization responsible for ensuring national security and you run several websites that are a trusted source of information for citizens and news agencies.

In November 2021, security researchers discovered a vulnerability that allows an attacker to take over a web server called Log4shell. Security updates resolving the issue were released on December 3, 2021. Your Organization uses the software in which the Log4shell vulnerability was discovered on all Web portals that are published on the Internet.

Ransomware Scenario

You are a government organization responsible for ensuring national security and you run several websites that are a trusted source of information for citizens and news agencies.

On December 20, 2022, all employees of your organization received an email with the title „The Obligatory Cyber Awareness Training - announcement." In the body of the message, the Organization's Board of Directors informed employees that due to the growing number of cyberattacks, all employees are required to undergo a cyber-awareness training. Attached to the message was a pdf file with the Board's resolution and an Excel spreadsheet containing a list of available training dates. Many employees of the Organization opened both files without any verification.



Website Defacement & Ransomware Scenarios

Link to the Cyber Fortress Game:

<https://cyberfortress.comcert.pl>

(the Team Captain ONLY)

list of Safeguards with description:

<https://cyberfortress.comcert.pl/safeguards>



The Game Session will last for: 50 min

Budget:



\$ 1 700 000



2ND GAME SESSION: WEBSITE DEFACEMENT & RANSOMWARE SCENARIOS


EFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS

Ransomware Scenario



Ransomware Scenario

Malware adds a malicious script to the user account properties. The script will be executed every time the user logs in




49 Workstation protection system (End Point Security) \$88,800

53 Software whitelisting \$88,800

57 Configuration Management Database System (CMDB) \$48,000

Malware tries to get the administrator credentials of the infected device




49 Workstation protection system (End Point Security) \$88,800

52 Application sandbox \$45,000

57 Configuration Management Database System (CMDB) \$48,000

Malware acquires administrative credentials of the infected device




24 Password policy \$25,000

42 Identity and Access Management System (IAM). \$178,000

43 Privileged Access Management (PAM) System. \$280,000

Malware disables antivirus protection and event logging




42 Identity and Access Management System (IAM). \$178,000

43 Privileged Access Management (PAM) System. \$280,000

49 Workstation protection system (End Point Security) \$88,800


Malware seeks other users' credentials





8 Hardening and updating of Network Servers and Devices \$88,000

15 Configuration management \$72,000



57 Configuration Management Database System (CMDB) \$48,000





Ransomware Scenario




Ransomware Scenario




Website Defacement Scenario



Website Defacement Scenario



Website Defacement Scenario



ORGANIZATION

PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

ENTIRE NETWORK

NETWORK EDGE

INTERNAL NETWORK



HOST

APPLICATIONS

DATA

DATA SOURCES

Website Defacement Scenario



Summary (MITRE - Mitigations)

Mitigation	Mitigated techniques use count by Threat Actors	Mitigated techniques use count by Malware	Techniques mitigated count
Privileged Account Management	102	103	103
User Account Management	83	94	82
Pre-compromise	74	74	75
Audit	66	66	67
Execution Prevention	62	62	63
Network Intrusion Prevention	58	57	58
Restrict File and Directory Permissions	55	55	56
Disable or Remove Feature or Program	55	54	55
Password Policies	42	43	43
User Training	40	39	40
Network Segmentation	43	41	39
Filter Network Traffic	39	38	39
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint	37	36	37
Operating System Configuration	35	35	36
Multi-factor Authentication	40	38	36
Update Software	31	33	31

<https://jkb-s.github.io/snake-attack/>

Summary (MITRE – Data Sources)

Data source	Data component	Sum of techniques' use count by Threat Actors	Sum of techniques' use count by Malware	Techniques count
Process		2051	6431	326
Network Traffic		1620	3367	236
Command		1530	4364	256
File		1390	3304	280
Windows Registry		374	1314	86
Script		302	720	26
Application Log		292	127	55
Module		256	532	50
Logon Session		240	117	41
Service		150	493	32

<https://jkb-s.github.io/snake-attack/>

Summary (MITRE – Data Sources)

Data source	Data component	Sum of techniques' use count by Threat		Techniques count
		Actors	Malware	
Process	OS API Execution	474	2176	78
	Process Access	102	236	18
	Process Creation	1361	3659	207
	Process Metadata	68	160	11
	Process Modification	26	128	9
	Process Termination	20	72	3
Process Summary		2051	6431	326
Network Traffic	Network Connection Creation	436	855	58
	Network Traffic Content	609	1358	96
	Network Traffic Flow	575	1154	82
Network Traffic Summary		1620	3367	236
Command	Command Execution	1530	4364	256
Command Summary		1530	4364	256
File	File Access	270	560	46
	File Creation	534	1031	88
	File Deletion	53	236	10
	File Metadata	249	676	37
	File Modification	284	801	99
File Summary		1390	3304	280
Windows Registry	Windows Registry Key Access	40	118	7
	Windows Registry Key Creation	99	342	17
	Windows Registry Key Deletion	38	162	4
	Windows Registry Key Modification	197	692	58
	Windows Registry Summary		374	1314

Cyber Fortress Enterprise - training



The Vendor Event



Cyber Fortress Education



Military University of Technology

WSB Universities




POLISH-JAPANESE ACADEMY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY



POLISH NAVAL ACADEMY of the Heroes of Westerplatte





Cyber Fortress LAB

- Using Real Life IT and OT Environments
- Emulation of TTP used in game scenarios
- Checking of efficiency chosen safeguards and data sources
- Verification of resilience and visibility of real environments

And the Winner is...

1st Game Session

Ardenia	55,14%
Delmarva	52,06%
Calendria	47,08%
Talgar	41,13%
Rivia	40,57%
Eledor	27,27%
Verden	27,12%

2nd Game Session

Verden	67,04%
Calendria	65,78%
Rivia	64,39%
Eledor	61,59%
Ardenia	58,84%
Delmarva	54,00%
Talgar	53,03%


And the Winner is...



1st place:	Ardenia	– 113,98
2nd place:	Calendria	– 112,86
3rd place:	Delmarva	– 106,06



Thank you!



CYBER FORTRESS
ENTERPRISE



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