



Center for Threat
Informed Defense

Attack Flow – Beyond Atomic Behaviors

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Who Are We?



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The Center for Threat-Informed Defense conducts collaborative R&D projects that **improve cyber defense at scale**




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
Membership is:

- Highly-sophisticated
- Global & cross-sector
- Non-governmental
- Committed to collaborative R&D in the public interest


The center by the numbers



1



29



7



24



4



17

Attack Flow Participants

ANOMALI

ATTACKIQ®

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 CYBER
THREAT
ALLIANCE

 GLOBAL
CYBER
ALLIANCE™


Outline

- Problem
 - What's the problem?
 - What's an attack flow?
- Solution
 - Attack flow data format
- Impact
 - How do attack flows help?
 - Attack flow corpus

Problem

What's the Problem?


- Defenders track adversary behaviors individually, but adversaries use *sequences* of techniques



- False positives harder to identify
- Incidents harder to understand
- Defensive planning is less effective
- Cyber assessments are less useful


What's the Problem?

- Defenders track adversary behaviors individually, but adversaries use *sequences* of techniques



Sequences of techniques create *relationships*


What's an Attack Flow?



An attack flow is a machine-readable representation of a sequence of actions and assets, plus knowledge properties.

How Do Attack Flows Help?

- Communication
- Intelligence exchange
- Operations
- Defensive planning
- Assessments



Solution


Learn by example

Schemas

- JSON Schema

```
▼ object {8}
  $schema : https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema
  $id : https://mitre-engenuity.com/schema/attack-flow/2021-10-13-draft.json
  title : Attack Flow
  description : This schema describes the Attack Flow JSON format.
  type : object
  ▼ properties {6}
    ▼ flow {4}
      description : An Attack Flow Meta object
      type : object
      ▼ properties {6}
        ▼ type {3}
          description : Indicate that this is an Attack Flow.
          type : string
          ▼ enum [1]
            0 : attack-flow
        ▼ id {3}
          description : The identifier for this Attack Flow. MUST be unique within this document. TODO: Ideally is unique among Attack Flows produced by a particular organization.
          type : string
          format : uri
        ▼ name {2}
          description : The name of the Attack Flow.
          type : string
```

- RDF (Graph) Schema



Short Interlude: RDF

What is RDF?

- RDF = Resource Description Framework



- URI = Unique Resource Identifier

RDF takes 3 URIs and turns them into a source node, relationship edge, and target node.

Ok, back to the example...

Start with data

• IR Report

Incident 12345


- * Mail logs show User A receives phishing email and opens attached macro-enabled word document on Host B
- * Proxy and host logs detect Host B beaconing to known C2, downloading the ransomware, and running it

• Red Team Report

Engagement 56789

- * Phished User A to run macro-enabled office document on Host B
- * Installed simulated ransomware through shell embedded in document on Host B

Structuring Data



Storage – JSON-SCHEMA


```
example_3.jsonld  x  example_3.json  x
1  {
2  "$schema": "../schema/attack-flow-2021-11-03-draft.json",
3  "actions": [
4    {
5      "description": "actor phishes a victim",
6      "id": "urn:absolute:example_3#action1",
7      "logic_operator": "AND",
8      "name": "action1"
9    },
10   {
11     "description": "victim opens file and runs macro that installs ransomware",
12     "id": "urn:absolute:example_3#action2",
13     "logic_operator": "AND",
14     "name": "action2"
15   }
16 ],
17 "assets": [
18   {
19     "id": "urn:absolute:example_3#asset1"
20   },
21   {
22     "id": "urn:absolute:example_3#asset2"
23   }
24 ],
25 "data_properties": [],
26 "flow": {
27   "created": "2022-04-11T16:39:00",
28   "id": "urn:absolute:example_3#example_flow3",
29   "name": "example_flow3",
30   "type": "attack-flow"
31 },
32 "object_properties": [],
33 "relationships": [
34   {
35     "source": "urn:absolute:example_3#asset1",
36     "target": "urn:absolute:example_3#action2",
37     "type": "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack-flow/state_requirement"
38   },
39   {
40     "source": "urn:absolute:example_3#action1",
41     "target": "urn:absolute:example_3#asset1",
```

Storage – JSON-LD (Linked Data)

```
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> [
1  [
2  {
3    "@id": " https://example.com/example_2#action1",
4    "@type": ["http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#NamedIndividual", "https://veriscommunity.net/attack-flow/Phishing", "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack_flow/action"],
5    "https://veriscommunity.net/attack-flow/action.social.vector": [
6      {
7        "@id": "https://veriscommunity.net/attack-flow/action.social.vector.Email"
8      }
9    ],
10   "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack_flow/description": [
11     {
12       "@value": "actor phishes a victim"
13     }
14   ],
15   "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack_flow/logic_operator": [
16     {
17       "@value": "AND"
18     }
19   ],
20   "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack_flow/state_change": [
21     {
22       "@id": " https://example.com/example_2#asset1"
23     }
24   ],
25   "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack_flow/described_by": [
26     {
27       "@id": " https://example.com/example_2#example_flow2"
28     }
29   ]
30 },
31 {
32   "@id": " https://example.com/example_2#action2",
33   "@type": ["http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#NamedIndividual", "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack_flow/action", "https://veriscommunity.net/attack-flow/Ransomware"],
34   "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack_flow/state_change": [
35     {
36       "@id": " https://example.com/example_2#asset2"
37     }
38   ],
39   "https://veriscommunity.net/attack-flow/action.malware.vector": [
40     {
41       "@id": "https://veriscommunity.net/attack-flow/action.malware.vector.Email"
42     }
43   ],
44   "https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack_flow/described_by": [
45     {
46       "@id": " https://example.com/example_2#example_flow2"
47     }
48   ]
49 }
50 ],
51 ]
```


So what's it look like?

Attack Flow Data Format




Three C's: Causality, Context, Complexity


Attack Flow Data Format - Causality




Attack Flow Data Format - Context



Attack Flow Data Format – Complexity



Attack Flow Data Format – Complexity



Analysis

Analysis

SPARQL Query & Update

first_repository

Editor only Editor and results Results only

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```
Unnamed × ⊕  
1 PREFIX af: <https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack-flow/>  
2 PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>  
3 SELECT DISTINCT ?asset  
4 WHERE {  
5   ?asset rdf:type af:asset .  
6 }
```

Run
keyboard shortcuts

Table Raw Response Pivot Table Google Chart Download as

Filter query results Showing results from 1 to 11 of 11. Query took 0.1s, moments ago.

	asset
1	ex3:asset1
2	ex3:asset2
3	ex4:asset1
4	ex4:asset2
5	ex4:asset3
6	ex4:asset4
7	ex4:asset5
8	ex4:asset6
9	ex4:asset7
10	ex4:asset8
11	ex4:asset9

SPARQL Query & Update

first_repository

Editor only Editor and results Results only

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```
1 PREFIX af: <https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack-flow/>  
2 PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>  
3 SELECT DISTINCT ?action  
4 WHERE {  
5   ?s rdf:type af:action .  
6   ?s rdf:type ?action  
7   FILTER(STRSTARTS(STR(?action), "https://veriscommunity.net/attack-flow/"))  
8 }
```

Run
keyboard shortcuts

Table Raw Response Pivot Table Google Chart Download as

Filter query results Showing results from 1 to 10 of 10. Query took 0.1s, moments ago.

	action
1	veris:Phishing
2	veris:Ransomware
3	veris:Use%20of%20stolen%20creds
4	veris:RAM%20scrapers
5	veris:Adminware
6	veris:RAT
7	veris:Profile%20host
8	veris:Exploit%20vuln
9	veris:Pass%20the%20hash
10	veris:OS%20commanding

Analysis

SPARQL Query & Update

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Editor only Editor and results Results only

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```
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1 PREFIX af: <https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack-flow/>
2 PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
3 SELECT DISTINCT ?asset
4 WHERE {
5   ?asset rdf:type af:asset .
6 }
```

Run keyboard shortcuts

Table Raw Response Pivot Table Google Chart Download as

Filter query results Showing results from 1 to 11 of 11. Query took 0.1s, moments ago.

	asset
1	ex3:asset1
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3	ex4:asset1
4	ex4:asset2
5	ex4:asset3
6	ex4:asset4
7	ex4:asset5
8	ex4:asset6
9	ex4:asset7
10	ex4:asset8
11	ex4:asset9

SPARQL Query & Update

first_repository

Editor only Editor and results Results only

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```
1 PREFIX af: <https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack-flow/>
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3 SELECT DISTINCT ?action
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5   ?s rdf:type af:action .
6   ?s rdf:type ?action
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8 }
```

Run keyboard shortcuts

Table Raw Response Pivot Table Google Chart Download as

Filter query results Showing results from 1 to 10 of 10. Query took 0.1s, moments ago.

	action
1	veris:Phishing atk:T1566
2	veris:Ransomware atk:T1486
3	veris:Use%20of%20stolen%20creds atk:T1586
4	veris:RAM%20scraper atk:T1003.001 - T1003.005, T1555.002
5	veris:Adminware atk:T1219
6	veris:RAT atk:T1014
7	veris:Profile%20host atk:T1595
8	veris:Exploit%20vuln atk:T1190

https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/attack_to_veris


Impact

Better Communication

- Document incident lessons learned
- Visualize IR/Threat Intel/Red Team data
 - Aggregate like nodes & actions
 - Filter tangential properties to simplify
- Explain defensive posture to executives




Better Communication



- Explain defensive posture to executives

Better Intelligence Exchange

- Attack flow sightings can be shared machine-to-machine
- Graph pattern communication



Better Operations

- Attack flow queries
 - Determining paths to/from an adversary technique difficult to mitigate
 - Query datasets for strategic insights (what happens the most → most important for me to mitigate)



SPARQL Query & Update 🔍 first_repository

Editor only Editor and results Results only 🛑

```
1 PREFIX af: <https://vz-risk.github.io/flow/attack-flow/>
2 PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
3 SELECT DISTINCT ?action
4 WHERE {
5   ?s rdf:type af:action .
6   ?s rdf:type ?action
7   FILTER(STRSTARTS(STR(?action), "https://veriscommunity.net/attack-flow/"))
8 }
```

Run keyboard shortcuts

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2	veris:Ransomware
3	veris:Use%20of%20stolen%20creds
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5	veris:Adminware
6	veris:RAT
7	veris:Profile%20host
8	veris:Exploit%20vuln
9	veris:Pass%20the%20hash
10	veris:OS%20commanding

Better Defensive Planning

- Understand attack surfaces (attack graph generation)
- Analyze risk
- Aggregate attack flows
- Build and communicate non-atomic detections
 - Hinges on data in records being properties that are connected to ground-truth actions and assets
- Identify cyberthreat choke points
 - Enables disruption of the adversary's attack model


Better Assessments

- Build Realistic Adversary Emulation Scenarios
 - Data driven red teaming
 - Subgraphs are key and are strung together:
If we succeed in action X on an asset, then we will attempt action Y from that asset
- Pen Testing
- Breach and Attack Simulation
 - Logic operator is key
 - Pair attack flow with planner & choose from available options

Attack Flow Corpus*

- Operation Cobalt Kitty
- Conti Ransomware Incident
- “From Zero to Domain Admin”
- “Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency”
- “Right to Left Override”
- Tesla’s Kubernetes Breach

* <https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/attack-flow/tree/main/corpus>



Please Contribute

Become an early adopter!

- Prototype capabilities
- Create structured reports – submit attack flows to corpus
- Provide feedback as GitHub issues
- Project Summary
 - <https://ctid.mitre-engenuity.org/our-work/attack-flow>
- “Attack Flow – Beyond Atomic Indicators”
 - <https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/attack-flow-beyond-atomic-behaviors-c646675cc793>
- GitHub
 - <https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/attack-flow>
 - <https://github.com/vz-risk/flow>

Questions?



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