



Living with Ransomware

The New Normal in Cyber Security

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Introduction: Presenters

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


Agenda

- Current Ransomware Threat Landscape
- Ransomware Groups: Motivation and Operation
- Managing Ransomware Attacks
- Interesting Real-world Cases
- Detection
- Forensics Best Practices
- Cyber Insurance Policies
- Communication Strategies
- Resources and further reading

Current Ransomware Threat Landscape

- Many Groups Operating Currently
- Targets:
 - Individuals, Small Businesses and Large Enterprises
 - Healthcare, Supply Chain, Government, Education
- Main Players:
 - REvil
 - Conti
 - Babuk
 - Darkside
- Ransomware Payments



Ransomware Groups: Motivation and Operation

- Motivation:
 - \$\$\$
 - Disruption
 - Testing/Experimentation
- Operation
 - RaaS
 - In-house development
 - Buy finished product



Ransomware attack 'not designed to make money', researchers claim

Managing Ransomware Attacks

BEFORE

- DR Plan
- IRP
- TableTop Exercises
- Design Backup Systems
- Test Backup Systems
- Threat Hunting

DURING

- Coordination
- Communication
- Containment
- Response
- Technical Analysis
- Threat Hunting

AFTER

- Restoration
- Back to BAU
- Root Cause Analysis
- Lessons Learnt
- Update DR plans
- Update IRP
- All the points in 'Before'

Real-world Cases 2022

- Freight Company
 - Threat Actors exploited the network back in 2020 (RDP)
 - The network was left exposed for a long time
 - Threat Actors installed MegaSync and exfiltrated data
 - Threat Actors used Ransomware in the end to encrypt servers
- Law Firm
 - Threat Actors used ProxyLogon
 - Ransomware was executed
 - Cron jobs were scheduled to spread the infection
 - TAs kept lowering the ransom demand

Detection

- In-house detection teams
- Threat-intel feeds
- Research publications

```
RAX 0000000000000000
RBX 00000000036C378
RCX 00000000013FE94 "C:\\windows\\utox.exe"
RDX 00000000C0000000
RBP 00000000013FF50
RSP 00000000013FC68
RSI 00000000036B798
RDI 00000000013FC00
```

Apr 19, 2021

DefendAgainst | MedusaLocker

```
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
```

Dec 23, 2021

DefendAgainst: Ransomware 'STOP'/DJVU

```
esxcli --formatter=csv --format-param=fields=="WorldID,DisplayName" vm
process list | awk -F "\"*,\"" '{system("esxcli vm process kill --
type=force --world-id=" $1)}'
```

Forensics Best Practices

- Virtual Machine snapshots – both current and before infection
- Available logs - cloud based and internal systems
- Active Monitoring - Endpoint detection and Response / Threat Hunting
- Engage specialist Incident Response and Forensics early

Cyber Insurance Policies

- Often the first port of call for victim organisations
- Facilitation of response management, legal counsel, engage forensics specialists, regulatory notifications, ransom payment negotiations, etc.
- Cost of Cyber insurance is skyrocketing and appropriate coverage is becoming a challenge.

Communication Strategies

- Critical component of the response - can affect the company brand.
- Many Stakeholders
 - Regulatory notifications and enquiries
 - Media
 - Customers
 - Internal staff
- Single point of contact for external communication.
- Consistent and timely based on available information.
- “Need to know basis” approach, prepare for possible scenarios.
- Legal and PR Approval.

Resources and further reading

<https://ransomwhe.re> - track ransomware payments

<https://ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch/blocklist/> - Blocklist

Ransomware: Understand, Prevent, Recover - Allan Liska

<https://www.cyber.gov.au/ransomware/protect-yourself-against-ransomware-attacks>

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Q&A

Thanks!

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