

Your phone is not your phone: a dive into SMS PVA fraud

Vladimir Kropotov, Zhengyu Dong, Ryan Flores, Fyodor Yarochkin, Paul Pajares
@vbkropotov
@fygrave



Agenda

- Introduction
- Dive into group
- Business as usual
- Impact and Implications
- Conclusions

About speakers

- Vladimir Kropotov: TrendMicro Security Research.
- Many years of threat hunting experience
- Research team: Vladimir Kropotov, Zhengyu Dong, Ryan Flores, Fyodor Yarochkin, Paul Pajares





Introduction

Historical Overview


WE OFFER 3 KINDS OF SERVICES
GOOD-CHEAP-FAST
BUT YOU CAN PICK ONLY TWO
GOOD & CHEAP WON'T BE FAST
FAST & GOOD WON'T BE CHEAP
CHEAP& FAST WON'T BE GOOD

- ROM pre-installed malware, how did it start?
- Mobile Supply Chain Attacks
- Known incidents, Response, Mitigation, Seizure





Terminology



- OEM original equipment manufacturer
- ODM original design manufacturer
- FOTA/OTA Firmware over the air
- **PVA** phone verified accounts

Hat tip to Łukasz Siewierski twitter.com/maldr0id

Mobile Supply Chain Attacks highlights


- Android market growth = ROM re-flashing services (刷機)
- Demand for custom ROM images
- Malware is activated on boot
- Unremovable, but can be detected by AV
- Low-cost mobile device brands mainly impacted
- Triada and Guerilla are prevalent families



image: kindpng.com



Timeline of Pre-installed Malware Events





People 's Daily Online >> Rolling News

Mobile phone Trojan steals 20 million contacts

February 28, 2015 01:31 Source: Beijing Times











Original title: Mobile phone Trojan steals 20 million contacts

Three companies developed a "silent plug-in", which used the flashing operation to install the plug-in into a parallel mobile phone, stealing nearly 20 million mobile phone user address books, involving 400,000 users. The reporter learned yesterday that 10 persons involved in the case from three companies were sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of three and a half years to one year and five months by the Chaoyang Court in the first instance for the crime of illegally obtaining computer information system data and illegally controlling computer information system. Beijing Times



https://www.chinanews.com.cn/




A notable case: Silent Plugin

A criminal case

re-flashing (刷機) to Silent Plugin "Maide" Company – used to promote Anfeng Appstore

Anfeng Company – Appstore developer



Promotion, revenue, private data


Wanfeng Company – provide rom packages, promote software for developers (for a fee)

Active in 2011-2012 10 Arrested and Fined in 2013





Timeline of Pre-installed Malware: Triada threat



Examples of news covering Triada

pcmag.com/news/thousands-of-cheap-android-phones-in-africa-were-pre-installed-with-malware

Thousands of Cheap Android Phones in **Africa Were Pre-Installed With Malware**

The hard-to-remove Triada malware was getting preinstalled on thousands of Tecno W2 handsets from a Chinese company called Transsion, according to security research from Upsteam Systems.



By Michael Kan August 24, 2020







Triada Delivered via FOTA/OTA



Catalin Cimpanu

April 6, 2021











Gigaset smartphones infected with malware due to compromised update server

Hackers have compromised at least one update server of German smartphone maker Gigaset and deployed malware to some of the company's customers.

The German company, which previously operated under the Siemens Mobile and BenQ-Siemens brands and was one of the largest mobile phone makers in the early 2000s before the smartphone era, admitted to the security breach in statements




Traditional Phones Impacted

Insight into business models of supply-chain crime business




https://news.iresearch.cn/content/202001/313754.shtml



Main Supply Chain Attack vectors

Different Persistence & delivery Mechanisms in Supply Chain:

- Pre-infected ROMs on devices
- Compromised FOTA/OTA updates or FOTA/OTA apps
- Compromised Software Supply Chain: software SDKs are compromised and used to deliver malicious components




https://therecord.media/official-client-for-the-apkpure-android-app-store-compromised-with-malware/



The Lemon Group: SMS PVA dealer

Public encounter of Lemon group





LEMON Platform for PVA/OTP

Adapted to 20+ MAINSTREAM APPS

EVERYDAY 10K+ Numbers UPDATED.

Covers 100+ Countries


Down to \$0.075/msg*

At Your Service!




SMS PVA/OTP Solution Provider

*Price varies according to quantity, the more the chalper.



Free SMS Verification Codes?






Lemon Group had Free and For-fee SMS services


• Lemon group advertised free SMS PVA codes under receivecode dot com and had a "lemon" platform as a business (for fee) platform.

 Advertisements were seen in YouTube and other locations

starting from 2018




Lemon SMS PVA Platform




Lemon SMS PVA Platform

- API and credits
- Service / Feature
- Request, Rent, Release
- of mobile numbers
- OTP or verification code
 from infected device
- Blocklist
- By country, New Project ID



Lemon network Infrastructure can be linked to Malicious Android Applications



Lemon "pluggable" Apps Design



Preinstalled Loader

plugins plugins

C2 request


commonHead.put("plugvcode", Str String[] arrayOfString = ToolsU: MLog.d("channel: " + arrayOfStr commonHead.put("channel", String commonHead.put("vcode", arrayOfStr

commonHead.put("nation", Locale
commonHead.put("producer", Built
commonHead.put("resolution", To
commonHead.put("sdk", Build.VER!
str = ToolsUtil.getSafeUUID(para
commonHead.put("uuid", str);

backend


Other plugins from Lemon Grooup

Lemon Group Supply Chain Compromise Architecture




SMS PVA and acquisition of short messages


SMS PVA +SMS Interception



SMS PVA +SMS Interception



SMS PVA +SMS Interception



SMS Plugin (Guerilla)

```
this.smsListener = new SMSListener(this, null);
this.smsListener2 = new SMSListener2(this, null);
LocalAMHook.addListener(this.smsListener);
LocalAMHook.addListener(this.smsListener2);
LocalAMHook.startHook(MHandlev2.mContext, 2);
MHandlev2.myHandler.sendEmptyMessage(1002);
MHandlev2.myHandler.sendEmptyMessage(3000);
if(SharedPreferencesUtils.getParam(MHandlev2.mContext, "sm_sp_cleared", "cc").equal v5 = 0;
}
```

Send SMS to backend with matching RegEx "matchedBody"

```
while(wsIndex2 < MHandleV2.this.wsRuleList.size()) {</pre>
   DataBean v5_1 = (DataBean)MHandleV2.this.wsRuleList.get(wsIndex2);
   if(v5_1.getStatus() == 1) {
       if(this.tempMsg.size() == 0 || wsIndex2 + 1 > this.tempMsg.size()) {
           if(TextUtils.isEmpty(v5_1.getRule_reg())) {
               break:
            v7 = SMSTools.matchedBody(v5_1.getRule_reg(), v2_1);
            MLog.d("tempMsg == null or index not exist, match : " + ((boolean)(((int)v7))));
       else if((this.tempMsg.containsKey(Integer.valueOf(wsIndex2))) && (SMSTools.isSameMsg(((Mes
            MLog.d("tempMsg != null , match : true");
       if(v7) {
            v5_1.setCode(SMSTools.matchedCode(v5_1.getRule_reg(), v2_1));
            v5_1.setCode_tpl(v2_1);
            v5_1.setCode_src(v1);
            v5_1.setStatus(0);
            Message uploadMsg = new Message();
            uploadMsg.what = 3002;
            uploadMsq.arg1 = wsIndex2;
            MHandleV2.this.sendMessage(uploadMsg);
```

```
this.wsRuleList = v6;
                                   V2.this.wsRuleList
public void onMessage(WebSocket webSocket
   MLog.d("=== onMessage text ===");
                                       ((DataBean)MHandleV2.
   MLog.d("get msg String: " + text);
   if(text != null && (text.contains("
      if(MHandleV2.this.task != null) {
          MHandleV2.this.task.cancel();
                                        Receive RegEx from C2
          MHandleV2.this.task = null;
                                        for SMS interception
      if(MHandleV2.this.timer != null) {
          MHandleV2.this.timer.cancel():
                                        "wsRuleList"
          MHandleV2.this.timer = null;
      String phone = "";
      int exc = 1;
      try {
          List v6 = WSRuleBean.jsonToObj(text).getData();
          MHandleV2.this.wsRuleList = v6;
          if(MHandleV2.this.wsRuleList != null && MHandleV2.this.wsRuleList.size() > 0) {
             phone = ((DataBean)MHandleV2.this.wsRuleList.get(0)).getPhone();
      catch(Exception e) {
          MLog.e("rule->obj", e);
          goto label 57:
```

WSRuleBean.jsonToObj(te

Lemon SMS PVA Codes Project List

Project ID (parameter pid=)	Platform	URL Detection	Sample SMS OTP	RegEx
pid=0148	LINE	744651	Please enter 1234 into LINE within	.*?(\d{4,6}).*(?:(?:LINE) (?:L
pid=0092	Jingdong	8556	The verification code is 123456 (do	.*?(\d{6}).*JD.*
pid=0275	WeChat	391	WeChat verification code (123456)	.*(?:(?:WeChat) (?:WeCh@
pid=0146	Jingdong 1000+	205	The verification code is 123456, ple	.*?(\d{6}).*JD.*
pid=0013	Facebook RegEx ru	les? 138	123456 is Name's Facebook confirm	.*?(\d{5,8}).*(?:(?:Facebook
pid=0107	WhatsApp	110	your whatsapp code: 123-456 you	[^\d]+(\d{3}-\d{3})([^\d]+.*
pid=0504	up live	100	【Uplive】 [123456] is your verific	.*Uplive.*?(\d{6}).*
pid=1115	Albert (Financial)	89		
ρια=υο4ο	Tinder	68	Use 123456 as your login code for T	.*Tinder.*?(\d{6}).*
pid=0015	Taobao	25	[Taobao.com] You applied for mob	.*(?:(?:Taobao) (?:Alibaba)
pid=0389	Skype	8	Authenticate your Skype callers wi	.*?([AZ az 0-9]{6}).*Skype.
pid=0085	Alipay	6	0911111111 You apply registration	(?!.*?edit).*?(\d{4,6}).*(?:(?
pid=0066	WeChat	5	WeChat verification code (123456)	.*(?:(?:WeChat) (?:WeCh@
pid=0097	Gmail	3	G-123456 is your Google verification	.*G*?(\d{6}).*
pid=0183	irctc	1	<#> 12345 is your onetime verificat	.*?(\d{5}).*IRCTC.*
pid=123	Apple ID	1	[Apple] Your Apple ID verificati	.*(?:(?:Apple) (?:APPLE)).*?

SMS PVA Codes for Jingdong Fraud



Phone Number Country	Jingdong
Thailand	5307
Mexico	348
Malaysia	336
S. Africa	135
Angola	116
Indonesia	96
United States	87
Colombia	49
Argentina	36
France	34
Belarus	23
Guyana	23
Comoros	16
Romania	13
Vietnam	12
Iraq	11
Other 44 Countries	137

Lemon SIM Cards
OTP Request for
Jingdong
URL parameter contains
Phone number and project
ID (platform)
TM Data Oct 2021 – Mar 2022

Lemon group also Sells Proxies

- Residential and Mobile Proxy
- Perfect for anonymity and bulk registration
- of accounts

- Allows to select a country to match the
- used phone number geographical location



UPDATED CONSTANTLY

CHEAP but only in the good way

price is LOW, but not SLOW

http://www.myzaker.com/article/5f44bf728e9f09748031fb92


Proxy Plugin (Guerilla)

- Proxy plugin
- Opens a proxy (socks5) service
- On infected device for requested period of time

```
If(v10 != null) {
    MLog.d("send final Result : " + ((boolean))(((int))v)
    String v1 = v10.getToken();
    int v6 = v10.getTimeout();
    String v2 = v10.getIp();
    int v3 = v10.getPort();
    int v5 = v10.getTdinc();
    int v4 = v10.getTd();
    int v5 = v10.getTd();
    int v4 = v10.getTd
```

```
@Override // pawn.okhttp3.WebSocketListener
public void onMessage(WebSocket webSocket, String text) {
   MLog.d("=== onMessage text ===");
   MLog.d("get msg String: " + text);
   if(text == null || !text.contains("rule")) {
        goto label_86;
   if(this.pingTask != null) {
        this pingTask.cancel();
        this.pingTask = null;
   if(this.pingTimer != null) {
        this.pinaTimer.cancel():
        this.pingTimer = null;
   boolean v9 = this.wsSendFinal();
        WSRuleBean v10 = WSRuleBean.jsonToObj(text);
        if(v10 != null) {
            MLog.d("send final Result : " + ((boolean)(((int)v9))));
            String v1 = v10.getToken();
            int v6 = v10.getTimeout();
            String v2 = v10.getIp();
            int v3 = v10.getPort();
            int v5 = v10.getTdinc();
            int v4 = v10.getTd();
            HashMap argWSType = new HashMap();
            argWSType.put("acttype", "ws_rule");
            argWSType.put("token", v1);
            ELKUtil.getInstance().sendEvent(MainHandler.mContext, argWSType, true);
            TranSocks5Manager.get().setCallBack(new CallBack() {
                @Override // com.android.systemui.ipclient.pdos95.socks5.TranSocks5Manager$CallBack
               public void onTimeOut() {
                    MainHandler.this.nextHeartBeat();
                    MainHandler.this.releaseWakeLock():
            TranSocks5Manager.get().initParams(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6);
            TranSocks5Manager.get().startProxy();
            MainHandler.this.acquireWakeLock();
            return;
```

So who is lemon? A Company in Hainan?



Recent developments: durian, no more lemon!



impact of compromised SMSes and verification codes

Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior

Anonymity

Circumvent regional restriction

Sign-in Bonuses (abuse)
App Gamification Bonus (abuse)

Avoiding penalties, liabilities

Consumer Privacy (compromised phone)


Other Scams, Fraud

Identity theft and SMS interception

- In many countries phones are defactor our electronic identities
- For some services, especially gov and finance, and even social media, capabilities to intercept auth SMS, create accounts linked

to particular phone -

Identity Theft






Anonymity

On compromised by thirdparty devices?




WhatsApp Token stealer



Coordinated inauthentic behavior

Facebook cookie stealer



Abuse of sign-in bonuses


Starbucks' new event was frantically smashed for only one day, and the company's business security was in emergency!

Recently, the threat hunter business intelligence monitoring platform monitored and found that Starbucks' marketing campaign "Starbucks APP Registration New Person launched on December 17, 2018 suffered a large-scale attack by black and gray proc The black production used a large number of mobile phone numbers to register a fa account of the Starbucks APP, and successfully received coupons for the event.









Consumer privacy and impact to compromised phone owners

- Your phone is not yours
- You probably will be the first person of interest for LE in the case of investigation
- You could be impersonated in any services, including social media platforms
- There might be illegal actions on behalf or your digital identity

Impact to online platforms and services: SMS verification code cannot be trusted

- One-time SMS is not enough
- Be cautious when launching sign-in bonus promotion esp. monetary value
- Origin of created accounts, identify fake ones
- Look for reuse profile, veracity of account vs variety of content

Impact on single sign-on services



Risks for Smartphone brand and vendors

Remember



- You always will have suppliers and contractors, not everyighing is at your full control
- Issues could have huge reputational impact

Lessons learned

What is important to keep in mind

- Mobile **supply chain assurance** by strong evaluation
- Online anonymity vs verified accounts
- Security model is broken and exploited at scale
- SMS PVA fraud's implication to law enforcement
- Evolving cybercrime business model
- Click ad fraud, pre-installed malware
- Data exfiltration and Identity theft, continuous persistence (silent loader)



Countermeasures

For Online Platforms and Services

- One-time SMS is not enough
- Be cautious when launching sign-in bonus promotion esp. monetary value
- Origin of created accounts, identify fake ones
- Look for reuse profile, veracity of account vs variety of content
- Use zero trust approaches to improve security

For Smartphone vendors

- Ensure provenance of the devices / brand name
- Perform security review on system image / trusted sources

For consumers

- Consider security when purchasing phone
- Secure device, periodical analysis, trusted apps, be wary of ROM images

More details

Can You Rely on OTPs? A Study of SMS PVA Services and Their Possible Criminal Uses

> SMS PVA services allow their customers to create disposable user profiles or register verified accounts on many popular platforms. Unfortunately, criminals can misuse these services to conduct fraud or other malicious

activities.

February 15, 2022











TREMO research

CTP sode \$234

Download SMS PVA: An **Underground Service Enabling** Threat Actors to Register Bulk Fake Accounts

https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/s ecurity/news/cybercrime-and-digitalthreats/can-you-rely-on-otps-a-study-ofsms-pva-services-and-possible-criminaluses

Thank you!



Questions?