


# SBOM to VEX - Discovering What's in the Box and How Badly it Can Hurt You

</ From the creators of the  
fastest growing open source  
kubernetes security platform

 Kubescape

**ARMO**



# /whoami

**Ben** Hirschberg

**Co-founder** & CTO @ARMO

**Kubescape** maintainer

**Whitehat** in the past (unofficially still ;-)

**Fluent** in Hebrew, Hungarian, C, ASM and Go

**Contributor** in CNCF + organizer of CNCF Jerusalem

**Father** of 4 <3



**@Ben Hirschberg**

 Ben-hirschberg

 @slashben81

 github.com/slashben

/man\_kubescape

**Kubernetes** security

**Scanning** and monitoring

**From** dev to production

**Misconfigurations** and vulnerability finding

**Operator** and CLI



**Kubescape**

 @Kubescape

 [github.com/kubescape/kubescape](https://github.com/kubescape/kubescape)

# /man\_armo

**ARMO**  
The makers of Kubescape

Kubescape ARMO Platform Resources Company Pricing Chat with an Expert Start Free Pick my demo time

\*No Slack account needed

## Cancel noise\_ Apply fix\_ Kubernetes\_secured

Actionable, contextual, end-to-end Kubernetes-native security. By Security standards, at DevOps pace.

Get a Demo →

</Loved by DevOps and trusted by Security at\_

Stanford Under Armour verizon connect Akamai orange

ARMO Workloads

Filter: All Filter Clear all

Highest risk resource

Resource	Cluster	Vulnerabilities
secured-middleware	prod-cluster	21 10
unauthenticated	prod-cluster	17 10
collector	prod-cluster	15 10
unauthenticated	cluster-ns-javacv-d	14 10
podignitor	cluster-ns-javacv-d	14 10 10 10
podignitor	secure-middleware	14 10
collector	cluster-ns-javacv-d	14 10 10
unauthenticated	secure-middleware	14 10
collector	prod-cluster	14 10 10

Filter overlay:

- Reachable
- Fixable
- Exploitable
- Filter by Severity:
- Severity:
- CVEs:




/usually...

**BEFORE A CYBER TALK**



**AFTER A CYBER TALK**



/this time

**BEFORE THIS TALK**



**AFTER THIS TALK**



# /cat agenda

- **SBOMs and VEXs**

- **Exploitability evaluation with eBPF**

- **Automation of VEX generation with Kubescape**

# /sausage-as-a-service

- Modern software contains **80-90%** open source software
- At least **70%** of the containerized workloads are coming from external sources
- **90%** of the first level dependencies have dependencies themselves






/sbom

If the sausage is your software,  
the SBOM is the list of the  
ingredients



# /sbom-use

- Licensing issues in an organization (software composition analysis)
- Security posture/exposure (software posture management)
- Strategic exposures in organizational software




# /sbom-generators

- Can only find what they are looking for
- Near 100% true positives



# /vulnerabilities-and-sbom



# /vulnerabilities-and-sbom



# /State of vulnerabilities

# ARMO

Comparing the whole sample to the sub-sample of graduated projects

Reviewing the  
distribution of severities

Reviewing top  
CVEs in both

Reachability



# /Image repos with most scans in the general sample


Top count of repo	# workload image scans
quay.io/argoproj/argocd	19,426
docker.io/bitnami/redis	13,308
quay.io/argoproj/argoexec	11,427
quay.io/prometheus-operator/prometheus-config-reloader	11,275
quay.io/kiwigrid/k8s-sidecar	6,581
quay.io/prometheus/prometheus	6,390
docker.io/bitnami/mongodb	6,312
quay.io/prometheus/node-exporter	5,569
gcr.io/datadoghq/agent	5,404

# /Image tags with most scans in the graduated sample

Top count of repo	# workload image scans
quay.io/argoproj/argocd	19,426
quay.io/argoproj/argoexec	11,427
quay.io/prometheus-operator/prometheus-config-reloader	11,275
quay.io/prometheus/prometheus	6,390
quay.io/prometheus/node-exporter	5,569
quay.io/prometheus/alertmanager	4,172
quay.io/prometheus-operator/prometheus-operator	4,088
registry.k8s.io/kube-proxy	3,530
registry.k8s.io/kube-state-metrics/kube-state-metrics	3,039



# /Comparison\_



# /TOP vulnerabilities in general population\_

1	CVE	Count of images	severity	description
2	CVE-2022-28391	36,579	High	BusyBox through 1.35.0 allows remote attacker
3	CVE-2021-33560	14,561	High	Libgcrypt before 1.8.8 and 1.9.x before 1.9.3 mi
4	CVE-2019-8457	14,543	Critical	SQLite3 from 3.6.0 to and including 3.27.2 is vu
5	CVE-2022-29458	14,531	High	ncurses 6.3 before patch 20220416 has an out-
6	CVE-2020-16156	14,391	High	CPAN 2.28 allows Signature Verification Bypass
7	CVE-2022-1304	14,224	High	An out-of-bounds read/write vulnerability was fo
8	CVE-2022-37434	12,159	Critical	zlib through 1.2.12 has a heap-based buffer ove
9	CVE-2021-46848	10,783	Critical	GNU Libtasn1 before 4.19.0 has an ETYPE_OK
10	CVE-2022-0778	10,480	High	The BN_mod_sqrt() function, which computes a

# /CVE-2022-28391

**CVSS vector:** AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

## **Description:**

BusyBox through 1.35.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code if netstat is used to print a DNS PTR record's value to a VT compatible terminal. Alternatively, the attacker could choose to change the terminal's `colors`.

## **Cloud native environment:**

If someone is running netstat in a Pod from a terminal while the attack controls the DNS entry the terminal is prone to the attack. Not a common scenario.

# /CVE-2021-33560

**CVSS vector:** AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

## **Description:**

Libgcrypt before 1.8.8 and 1.9.x before 1.9.3 mishandles ElGamal encryption because it lacks exponent blinding to address a side-channel attack against mpi\_powm, and the window size is not chosen appropriately. This, for example, affects use of ElGamal in OpenPGP.

## **Cloud native environment:**

Libgcrypt is around in many images for GPG signature verification of APT/YUM packages. It is mostly not in use during deployment + no private key in the image

# /CVE-2019-8457

**CVSS vector:** AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

## **Description:**

SQLite3 from 3.6.0 to and including 3.27.2 is vulnerable to heap out-of-bound read in the rtreenode() function when handling invalid rtree tables.

## **Cloud native environment:**

If the attacker can inject arbitrary SQL statements then the attacker can get arbitrary code execution. SQLite is part of Centos/RH base images.

**/Opinion: these are the vulnerabilities has some probability to be exploited**

\*gut feeling :-/

1	CVE	Count of images	severity	description		
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8	CVE-2022-37434	12,159	Critical	zlib through 1.2.12 has a heap-based buffer over		
9	CVE-2021-46848	10,783	Critical	GNU Libtasn1 before 4.19.0 has an ETYPE_OK		
10						

# /TOP vulnerabilities in graduated projects

1	CVE	Count of imag	severity	description
2	CVE-2015-5237	119	High	It was discovered that the protobuf library and code
3	CVE-2022-21698	17	High	In client_golang prior to version 1.11.1, HTTP serve
4	CVE-2022-31836	16	Critical	Function leafInfo.match() use path.join() to deal wit
5	CVE-2022-46146	13	High	Prometheus Exporter Toolkit is a utility package to l
6	CVE-2022-31054	7	High	Argo Events is an event-driven workflow automatio
7	GHSA-qpgx-64h2-gc3c	7	High	The package github.com/argoproj/argo-events/sens
8	CVE-2020-16156	6	High	CPAN 2.28 allows Signature Verification Bypass.
9	CVE-2021-33560	6	High	Libgcrypt before 1.8.8 and 1.9.x before 1.9.3 mish
10	CVE-2019-8457	6	Critical	SQLite3 from 3.6.0 to and including 3.27.2 is vulne

# /CVE-2015-5237

**CVSS vector:** AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

**Description:**

protobuf allows remote authenticated attackers to cause a heap-based buffer overflow

**Cloud native environment:**

It is indeed a vulnerability in protobuf C/C++ package. But not in the Golang package!

<https://github.com/anchore/grype/issues/558>




# /Opinion: these are the vulnerabilities has some probability to be exploited

\*gut feeling :-/

1	CVE	Count of imag	severity	description
2				
3	CVE-2022-21698	17	High	In client_golang prior to version 1.11.1, HTTP server
4	CVE-2022-31836	16	Critical	Function leafInfo.match() use path.join() to deal wit
5	CVE-2022-46146	13	High	Prometheus Exporter Toolkit is a utility package to l
6	CVE-2022-31054	7	High	Argo Events is an event-driven workflow automatio
7	GHSA-qpgx-64h2-gc3c	7	High	The package github.com/argoproj/argo-events/sen
8				
9				
10				


# / Looking at general results\_

**Average  
vulnerability  
count per severity**





**WAIT A SECOND...**



/rewind




/is\_it?

Vulnerability  
in image




Application  
exploit

# /vulnerabilities in common images\_



# /Kubescape reachability



Scan image


eBPF

Compare against SBOM


Feed to Vulnerability scanner



# /Kubescape reachability



# /Kubescape reachability results



# /what-is-kubescape



Kubescape


- CNCF Project
- Kubernetes security side-kick
- Configuration & Vulnerability analysis
- Runtime detection
- 10k GitHub stars
- Widely adopted tool (both CLI and service)

SCAN ME



# /Looking only at filtered results\_

**Average relevant  
vulnerability  
count per severity**



/vex

If SBOM is like the ingredient list of a sausage, then VEX is like the list of allergens



```
{
  "@context": "https://openvex.dev/ns/v0.2.0",
  "@id": "https://openvex.dev/docs/example/vex-9fb3463de1b57",
  "author": "Wolfi J Inkinson",
  "role": "Document Creator",
  "timestamp": "2023-01-08T18:02:03.647787998-06:00",
  "version": "1",
  "statements": [
    {
      "vulnerability": {
        "name": "CVE-2014-123456"
      },
      "products": [
        {"@id": "pkg:apk/distro/git@2.39.0-r1?arch=armv7"},
        {"@id": "pkg:apk/distro/git@2.39.0-r1?arch=x86_64"}
      ],
      "status": "fixed"
    }
  ]
}
```

/vex-promise



# /vex-reality

- Preparing and maintaining reliable VEX is time consuming
- “Not good” if not reliable





/vex-solution-1



Waiting  
for  
vendor VEX



Generating  
VEX

The screenshot shows a GitHub issue page for the repository 'kubescape / kubevuln'. The issue title is 'Generation of VEX documents by the Kubescape relevancy engine #155', which is marked as 'Closed'. The issue was opened by 'slashben' on Oct 10 and has 4 comments. The 'Overview' section describes how Kubescape calculates the relevancy of container image vulnerabilities using eBPF and produces a filtered list of vulnerabilities. The 'Solution' section explains that the *Kubevuln* component watches for filtered SBOM objects and generates a VEX object when a filtered vulnerability is created. The issue is categorized as an 'enhancement' and is labeled 'good first issue' and 'open-for-contribution'. The right sidebar shows the issue's metadata, including assignees, labels, projects, milestones, development status, and notifications. The bottom of the page shows a comment by 'puerco' on Oct 10.

kubescape / kubevuln

Q Type 🔗 to search

<> Code Issues 9 Pull requests 5 Discussions Actions Projects Wiki Security 11 Insights Settings

## Generation of VEX documents by the Kubescape relevancy engine #155

🔒 Closed slashben opened this issue on Oct 10 · 4 comments

Member

### Overview

Kubescape calculates the relevancy of container image vulnerabilities by monitoring using eBPF the application behavior and produces a filtered list of vulnerabilities. Today the results are stored in the same format as the vulnerabilities, however the [VEX](#) seems to be a much better choice to store and publish this information. Kubescape needs to publish the filtered list of vulnerabilities in a VEX format.

### Solution

In the current state, the *Kubevuln* is watching the filtered [SBOM objects](#), every time a new object is created or updated a filtered SBOM is created by the node-agent with only those modules that were loaded into the memory.

When a new filtered SBOM is available, the *Kubevuln* translates the SBOM to vulnerability list using Grype to create a filtered vulnerability list.

In the same step when the filtered vulnerability is created, *Kubevuln* should generate a VEX object. The object contains statements that all these vulnerabilities are loaded into the memory therefore they're relevant. This object should be stored as an API objects another vulnerability related.

See more at [here](#)

cc: @craigbox @puerco

3

puerco commented on Oct 10

Assignees  
No one—assign yourself

Labels  
enhancement good first issue open-for-contribution

Projects  
None yet

Milestone  
No milestone

Development  
Create a branch for this issue or link a pull request.

Notifications  
Unsubscribe

You're receiving notifications because you modified the open/close state.

3 participants

# /ks\_installation



Kubescape

```
$ helm repo add kubescape https://kubescape.github.io/helm-charts/  
$ helm repo update  
$ helm upgrade --install kubescape kubescape/kubescape-operator -n kubescape  
--create-namespace --set clusterName=`kubectl config current-context` --set  
capabilities.vexGeneration=enable  
$ kubectl -n kubescape get pods
```

NAME	READY	STATUS	RESTARTS	AGE
kubescape-6bd764869d-nmk5k	1/1	Running	0	99s
kubevuln-76bbddfcd4-8fxcq	1/1	Running	0	99s
node-agent-dnf6l	1/1	Running	0	99s
operator-75c999bfc6-dlfj8	1/1	Running	0	99s
storage-5898d46fd-rmv4x	1/1	Running	0	99s

# /generating VEX



Kubescape

```
$ kubectl apply -f https://k8s.io/examples/application/deployment.yaml
```

```
$ kubectl -n kubescape get openvulnerabilityexchangecontainer $(kubectl -n kubescape  
get openvulnerabilityexchangecontainer -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}') -o  
jsonpath='{.spec}' > nginx.json
```

```
$ jq "." nginx.json | grep -c "\"affected\""
```

```
58
```

```
$ jq "." nginx.json | grep -c "\"not_affected\""
```

```
338
```

# /using\_with\_grype



```
$ grype nginx:1.14.2 --vex nginx.json
✓ Vulnerability DB           [no update available]
✓ Loaded image
nginx:1.14.2
✓ Parsed image
sha256:295c7be079025306c4f1d65997fcf7adb411c88f139ad1d34b537164aa060369
✓ Cataloged packages        [111 packages]
✓ Scanned for vulnerabilities [58 vulnerability matches]
├─ by severity: 55 critical, 102 high, 85 medium, 52 low, 102 negligible
└─ by status:   126 fixed, 270 not-fixed, 338 ignored
```

# /takeaways

- **Vulnerabilities by scanners are mostly wrong**
- **Good VEX can mitigate this**
- **VEX can be enhanced automatically**

# /contribute\_to\_the\_effort

- **As a user**

- **As a developer**

- **As a security expert**

# Thank you



[www.armosec.io](http://www.armosec.io)