



27th ANNUAL
FIRST **BERLIN**
CONFERENCE

14-19 JUNE 2015

**UNIFIED SECURITY:
IMPROVING THE FUTURE**



I'm Sorry to Inform You...

Dr. Marie Moe



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UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Judge Business School


Centre for
Risk Studies



@MarieGMoe

@blackswanburst

How we met...



How did I come to trust him?

Information sharing with NorCERT

I read his thesis

We met in person several times

Responsive and professional contact

Others vouched for him



How did I come trust her?

Face to Face contact

Willingness to use strong cryptography in emails

She provided feedback (where others didn't)

Independent verification of facts

Yearly communication


Working further incidents

Core question:

- How do I know this info doesn't flow straight to the offensive national team?



Information sharing



In retrospect

I should have included vulnerabilities

- I was uncomfortable sending both IPs and vulnerabilities to one country for distribution
- So I just sent IPs to ICS-CERT
- That mean Marie couldn't have much traction
- Since she didn't have evidence of vulnerability
- The context was challenging to convey to the asset owners

In the future I'd give more details



Informing by proxy.

I used ICS-CERT/DHS in 2011

- They shared with 52 certs

I worked with 12 certs in 2012


- Codesys Vulnerabilities (detailed later)

Basic Process



- Send them an email about what you have
- Attach GPG key and sign email
- Offer them data
- When they respond, send it to them encrypted




How do you approach companies?



Who in the organisation should you be speaking to?



How do you explain vulnerabilities and exposure?



One time during an incident: 'assisted scope discovery'

Client thought only email
had been compromised

Turned out
to be
wrong, but
useful

Forensics on a disk
suggested exfiltration of
data

I suggested it
might be box that
contained email

Client then
thought single
windows box was
infected


Knowledge of
IODINE allowed
me to suggest
DNS traffic
examination in
openflow

Got a handle on
volume of
exfiltrated data


Suggested looking
at where profile
had roamed



How do you tell them they're owned/infected?



How do you tell them they're causing someone else harm?



The CodeSys Story

Table 1. Ten Autonomous Systems containing the largest number of vulnerable PLCs


PLCs Found	ASN	CC	Registrar	AS Name
9	6327	CA	arin	Shaw Communications Inc.
9	6830	AT	ripence	Liberty Global Operations B.V.
12	5610	CZ	ripence	Telefonica Czech Republic, a.s.
21	28929	IT	ripence	ASDASD-AS ASDASD srl
25	12605	AT	ripence	LIWEST Kabelmedien GmbH
28	3269	IT	ripence	Telecom Italia S.p.a.
28	3303	CH	ripence	Swisscom (Switzerland) Ltd
43	1136	EU	ripence	KPN Internet Solutions ²
43	286	EU	ripence	KPN Internet Backbone
44	3320	DE	ripence	Deutsche Telekom AG

Table 2. Ten Countries containing the largest number of vulnerable PLCs


PLCs Found	Country Code
21	CA
21	ES
29	CZ
33	AT
33	US
38	CH
60	PL
64	NL
80	DE
81	IT



How not to do it.




The shock effect 1



Source: <https://youtu.be/okhfDsKmAoY?t=218>



The Null CTRL article series



RAISING AWARENESS John Matherly created the search engine Shodan. He believes he is on the side of good, combating poor security and raising awareness. Video: Øistein Norum Monsen/Dagbladet


Journalists warned system owners and Norwegian NSA of 2500 critical data flaws

How two journalists set out on a mission to test the data security in the whole of Norway.

Source: http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/01/06/nyheter/nullctrl/shodan/english/english_versions/30861347/



The shock effect 2



Source: <http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/10/14/nyheter/innenriks/nullctrl/datasikkerhet/29071043/>



Havex/Dragonfly/Energetic Bear

August 28, 2014

Hundreds of Norwegian energy companies hit by cyber-attacks

Share this article:    

Approximately 300 oil and energy companies in Norway have been hit by one of the biggest cyber-attacks ever to have happened in the country, a government official is reported to have claimed.

As first reported by The Local and Dagens *Næringsliv*, the National Security Authority Norway (Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet – NSM) detailed how 50 companies in the oil sector were hacked and how another 250 have been warned that they may have been hit too.

NSM is Norway's prevention unit for serious cyber-attacks and, like CERT-UK in Great Britain, warns companies about the newest threats. It took part of the CyberEurope2014 exercise in June.

The companies themselves haven't been named – although NSM is investigating whether the computer systems at Statoil, Norway's largest oil company, were targeted. Technical details are also few and far between at this moment in time.



Hundreds of Norwegian energy companies hit by cyber-attacks

Source: <http://www.scmagazineuk.com/hundreds-of-norwegian-energy-companies-hit-by-cyber-attacks/article/368539/>

Mozilla Thunderbird

File Edit View Go Message Tools Help

Get Mail Write Chat Address Book Tag

From [redacted] ☆ Reply Reply Followup Forward

Subject **Shipping notification** 06/11/2014 12:14 PM

To [redacted] ☆ Other Actions

Posten.no
Notification

Your parcel has arrived at May 27th, 2014. Courier was unable to deliver the parcel to you.

Get your label and show it in the nearest post office to get a parcel.

[http://www.\[redacted\].com/wp-content/plugins/google-analytics-for-wordpress/cnchap0.php](http://www.[redacted].com/wp-content/plugins/google-analytics-for-wordpress/cnchap0.php)
Print Shipping Label

Copyright 2014 Posten Norge. All Rights Reserved.

2 attachments 985 KB Save All

posten1693798.jpg 128 KB posten1693798.pdf 857 KB



Mozilla Thunderbird

File Edit View Go Message Tools Help

Get Mail Write Chat Address Book Tag

From [redacted] ☆ Reply Reply Followup Forward

Subject **International Conference on Energy and Environment Research 2014** 06/03/2014 07:06 AM

To [redacted] ☆ Other Actions

Dear Colleagues,

You are invited to participate in the forthcoming International Conference on Energy and Environment Research (ICEER 2014), which will be held in Madrid, Spain during July 18-19, 2014. ICEER is an event that focuses on the state of the art technologies pertaining to Energy and Environment Research. The applications of Energy and Environment Research to such domains as astronomy, biology, education, geosciences, security and health care are among topics of relevance to ICEER. It is a technical congregation where the latest theoretical and technological advances on Energy and Environment Research are presented and discussed. We expect that the conference and its publications will be a trigger for further related research and technology improvements in this important subject. ICEER promotes fundamental and applied research continuing advanced academic education and transfers knowledge between involved both sides of and the Energy and Environment Research.

For registration information you are to contact the conference Registrar.
Please share this information with your colleagues.

Sincerely
International Conference on Energy and Environment Research Committee.

1 attachment: Conference_program.doc 1.9 KB Save

Conference_program.doc 1.9 KB



Ideas and solutions for remote maintenance.

mbNET **mbCONNECT24** **mymbCONNECT24**



MB CONNECT LINE
remote maintenance solutions

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[Homepage](#) | [Support](#) | [Downloads](#) | [mbCONNECT24](#) | [Software](#)

Software Downloads

mbCHECK (EUROPE)



diagnostic program mbCHECK for mbCONNECT24 server location EUROPE

Version: V 1.1.2

MD5 Checksum: A61FCB0F09F99E57B10F663923ECD472

mbCHECK (USA/CAN)



diagnostic program mbCHECK for mbCONNECT24 server location USA / CAN

Version: V 1.1.2

MD5 Checksum: BB977F03FEF48CE28DA48199EE8CFD6F

NEWS

[all News »](#)

Career Opportunities:IT Specialist
Customer Support and Training f / m

Career Opportunities:IT Security
Specialist / IT Security Manager f / m

MB CONNECT LINE now part of the
"Cluster Mechatronik und Automation"

Manipulationen an SPS sicher
erkennen

LUA scripting workshop for
mbNET.toolbox/mbSPIDER



In retrospect

Sending out physical letters was not very useful

The crisis management personnel were not always the best contact points

The media “got it wrong”, however the effect was good nonetheless

With the KraftCERT establishment we should do better the next time



Good Reactions

I accept the risk


Here's some more info
on that attacker

Thank you, we'll pass
this to the DFIR team


Thank you

That's a larger scope
than we realised

It's a
honeypot/Lab/testsystem



Bad Reactions



Conclusion



Questions



Thank you

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