



The Security Division of NETSCOUT

PyNetSim

A modern INetSim Replacement

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BackGround

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Why?

- Research teams may need a simulated environment because
 - They are not allowed to directly contact malware C2s
 - Trying to avoid tipping off threat actors
 - Command-and-control servers are down
- DNS redirection isn't enough
 - Hard-coded DNS servers still circumvent
 - Hard-coded IP addresses in lieu of DNS
- Internet simulation also allows for
 - Possibility of collecting client communications used to develop signatures
 - Keeping malware alive in memory long enough to take memory snapshots for static analysis
 - Test protocol re-implementation for a botnet monitoring system
 - QA of parsing / implementation of intelligence feeds
 - Possibility to direct actions of executed malware to activate certain pieces of code

Existing Solutions

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InetSim

- The Original Internet Simulator
- Written in Perl ☹️
- Built-in traffic redirection support relies on obsolete ip_queue support in Linux kernel
 - Other ways to get around this
- Significant Protocol Support
 - HTTP(S)
 - SMTP(S)
 - POP3(S)
 - FTP(S)
 - DNS
 - TFTP
 - IRC
 - Others

FakeNet-NG

- Released by FireEye's FLARE team at BlackHat USA 2016
 - <https://github.com/fireeye/flare-fakenet-ng/>
 - Actively maintained
- Supports multiple protocols + SSL on most protocols
 - TFTP
 - SMTP
 - POP
 - IRC
 - HTTP
 - FTP
 - DNS
- Windows + Linux support (only recently learned of Linux support)
 - AFAICT, no dynamic protocol / SSL support
 - Doesn't speak malware protocols

PyNetSim



PyNetSim

- Built using Python3
- Goal is to dynamically detect the TCP / UDP protocol used
 - Detect HTTP on non-standard ports
 - Detect Telnet on non-standard ports
 - Detect TLS/SSL enabled connections on non-standard ports
- Attempt to detect malware protocol used and speak that protocol
 - Allows for “proper” responses to keep an infected system “talking”
 - Keeps malware running for memory forensics, debugging purposes
 - Directed execution via commands sent back
 - Example: Alina requires a non-standard HTTP status code of 666 in the response
 - Example: Mirai CnCs have increasingly used ports 80 and 443 to evade port-based blocking, but is very recognizable in comparison to HTTP / HTTPS

Configuration

```
[main]
max_connections = 1000
listen_host = 192.168.56.101
listen_port = 12345
default_rcv_size = 8192

[tcp]
protocols = http, mirai, ftp, smtp
# probe response in the event the server needs to be the first to send a message
probe_response = 220 Welcome
sleep_time = 60

[udp]
protocols = ntp, dns

[dns]
# default response for A records one of random, hardcoded - if hardcoded, default_ip is used
response_type = random
default_ip = 127.0.0.1
mailserver_count = 3
mailserver_prefix = smtp
text_response =

[ftp]
file_list = password.txt, evil.doc, secret.exe

[http]
protocols = drive, andromeda
server_name = Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
response_code = 200
connection = close

[drive]
server_name = nginx/1.11.1
```

Traffic Redirection

- Two ways to handle traffic redirection...
 - The hard way
 - Using NFQUEUE
 - NFQUEUE allows for incoming packets to be assigned to a queue that a listening program can consume from
 - Consuming the packets allows for parsing and manual response of things that would otherwise be rejected
 - Allows for keeping records of original address and port
 - Requires manual everything - handshakes, seq/ack calculation, ACKs, etc.
 - The easy way
 - Use built-in IPTABLES functionality
 - -j REDIRECT to send all ports from specified protocols to a single port
 - Now only need to listen on one port and let kernel take care of the rest
 - Downside: lose the original address and port which may help to hint the protocol

PyNetSim Protocols

- Targeting protocols that may be used by malware to communicate or exfiltrate data
- Dynamic SSL detection
- DNS – UDP & TCP
 - Respond with hardcoded or random non-RFC 1918 address
 - Responds to A, AAAA, MX, TXT, and CNAME types
- HTTP
 - DirtJumper / Drive families
 - Andromeda
- Telnet
 - Simple login / shell simulation
- SMTP
- FTP
- IRC
- Binary malware protocols
 - Mirai
 - LizardStresser

Dynamic Protocol Detection

- Inspired by scapy's "guess_payload" functionality for dissecting packets properly
- Peek at first payload, pass to known L7 protocol layers
 - Each high-level protocol may then opt to pass to child protocols
- First test for a TLS Client Hello
 - If detected, use `ssl.wrap_socket` and then continue checking the payload
- Each protocol has a set of defined child protocols in the config
- Each protocol has its own set of options to use
- Use `dpkt` where possible to help guess protocol using its parsing layers

Protocol Detection Example - SMTP

```
@classmethod
def guess_protocol_from_payload(cls, payload, config, addr):
    """
    Iterates through known protocols to see if the payload is recognized

    :param payload: raw payload received from a connection
    :param config: configuration object
    :param addr: connection address

    :return: Protocol object
    """
    identified_protocol = TCP
    if payload.startswith((b"HELO", b"EHLO")):
        identified_protocol = SMTP
    return identified_protocol
```

Demos

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Conclusion

- Available on GitHub
 - <https://github.com/arbor-jjones/pynetsim>
- Future Work
 - Automated building / setup via Dockerfile / Vagrant / etc
 - Solidify TLS / SSL support
 - Dynamic generation of self-signed certs based on name in SNI
 - Storage of keys for passing back to analyst / processing system to decrypt traffic
 - Pcap / payload export
 - Include decrypted SSL payloads
 - REST-ful API to query data
 - Better traffic redirection
 - Properly handle “special” DNS queries
 - SORBS / DNS-based blacklist checks used by malware like Sarvdap
 - Proper DNS exfiltration responses where required

