

Hunting and Automation Using Open Source Tools

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CB TAU Threat Researchers

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- Development of TAU Research lab, Automation, Binary Analysis, Hunting
- Seasoned security operations analyst



Brian Baskin

- Research, Reverse Engineering, Automation, Hunting
- Formerly with US Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) focusing on military network intrusions



Agenda

Baselineing: What and Why


Blueprinting your Organization

Automate the SOC

Threat Hunting

Baselining: What and Why

Know Your Environment



Know Your Environment

- With Baselineing, turn over every stone; even normal behavior may be abnormal in reality
- When processing data, *classify* normal behavior and abnormal behavior
 - Certain behaviors can have multiple classifications
- Start your classification buckets large, add detail after each pass



Baselining vs Blueprinting Methods

Reactive

- Firehose of data
- Ingest all data into SIEM
- Tune False Positives Forever



Proactive


- Blueprint First
- Create rules for abnormal behavior
- Suffer less False Positives



Tools and Procedures

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Enterprise Blueprinting



- Open source tool for querying endpoint metadata (at scale) like a database
- Utilizes SQL to expose data via a common interface
- Extensible in a number of languages
 - Add your own query-able data types



- Easy to get data from a number of endpoints at scale
- Quickly query data using a common language (SQL)
- Exhaustive list of metadata that is continually growing




- May be difficult to deploy across entire environment
 - Common orchestration tools can help with this (Ansible, Puppet, Chef)!

OSQuery Further Information


- List of schema available at <https://osquery.io/schema/>
- Some schema offer event information such as *process_file_events* which includes timestamps with when an event took place
 - Can only get this info if running OSquery in daemon mode, as it is an *evented table*
- Other file information schema:
 - Signature information
 - Startup items
 - Scheduled tasks

Low Prevalence Executables



Low Prevalence Executables

- One-offs or rare applications
- Care less about the most common running programs
- Classify normal and abnormal for rarities to job functions




Leveraging OSQuery

```
osquery> SELECT name, pid, path, start_time FROM processes;
```

name	pid	path	start_time
systemd	1	/usr/lib/systemd/systemd	0
rcu_sched	10		0
migration/18	100		0
udisksd	1002	/usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd	15
ksoftirqd/18	101		0
systemd-logind	1024	/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logind	16
gssproxy	1025	/usr/sbin/gssproxy	16
irqbalance	1026	/usr/sbin/irqbalance	16
smartd	1028	/usr/sbin/smartd	16
kworker/18:0H	103		0
lsmd	1032	/usr/bin/lsmd	16
watchdog/19	104		0
alsactl	1040	/usr/sbin/alsactl	16
migration/19	105		0
kworker/23:2	10555		17627181
ksoftirqd/19	106		0
mcelog	1068	/usr/sbin/mcelog	17
kworker/19:0H	108		0
kworker/16:2	10880		17627184
watchdog/20	109		0

Networking Data

- SNMP (or equivalent) to pull data from your networking devices
- ARP Tables are a great start for network data collection
- Acquire IP and MAC addresses easily
- MAC Addresses are a great way to identify vendors on your network



Common OUIs


<https://www.wireshark.org/tools/oui-lookup.html>

00:05:69 VMware VMware, Inc.
00:0C:29 VMware VMware, Inc.
00:1C:14 VMware VMware, Inc.
00:50:56 VMware VMware, Inc.


00:06:1B Notebook Notebook Development Lab. Lenovo Japan Ltd.
00:12:FE LenovoMo Lenovo Mobile Communication Technology Ltd.
00:59:07 Lenovoem LenovoEMC Products USA, LLC
0C:CB:85 Motorola Motorola Mobility LLC, a Lenovo Company
14:1A:A3 Motorola Motorola Mobility LLC, a Lenovo Company
14:30:C6 Motorola Motorola Mobility LLC, a Lenovo Company

00:00:97 DellEmc Dell EMC
00:01:44 DellEmc Dell EMC
00:06:5B Dell Dell Inc.
00:08:74 Dell Dell Inc.
00:0B:DB Dell Dell Inc.
00:0D:56 Dell Dell Inc.
00:0F:1F Dell Dell Inc.
00:11:43 Dell Dell Inc.
00:12:3F Dell Dell Inc.
00:12:48 DellEmc Dell EMC
00:13:72 Dell Dell Inc.
00:14:22 Dell Dell Inc.
00:15:30 DellEmc Dell EMC
00:15:C5 Dell Dell Inc.

00:60:B0 HP
08:00:09 HP
10:00:90 HP



or



Using OSQuery to Enrich Networking Data

- OSQuery is a great tool to grab point-in-time endpoint data to supplement networking data
- Compare NICs and ARP tables on endpoint against Networking equipment ARP tables
- Great way to do full-coverage rogue detection

Getting ARP Data from OSQuery

- Using the *osqueryi* command locally we can test out our queries before running against whole environment

```
osquery> SELECT * from arp_cache;
```

address	mac	interface	permanent
10.1	00:50:56	em1	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
10.1	00:0c:29	em1	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
172.	02:42:ac	docker0	0
172.	02:42:ac	docker0	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
172.	02:42:ac	docker0	0
172.	02:42:ac	docker0	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
172.	02:42:ac	docker0	0
172.	02:42:ac	docker0	0
172.	02:42:ac	br-423ba2418f06	0
172.	02:42:ac	docker0	0
172.	02:42:ac	docker0	0
10.1	00:00:00	em1	0
10.1	00:50:56	em1	0


```
osquery> SELECT a.address AS address, a.mac AS mac, a.interface AS interface, i.address AS interface_address  
...> FROM arp_cache AS a  
...> INNER JOIN interface_addresses AS i  
...> ON a.interface = i.interface  
...> WHERE a.interface = "em1";
```

address	mac	interface	interface_address
10.	00:50:56	em1	10.
10.	00:50:56	em1	fe8
10.	00:0c:29	em1	10.
10.	00:0c:29	em1	fe8
10.	00:00:00	em1	10.
10.	00:00:00	em1	fe8
10.	00:50:56	em1	10.
10.	00:50:56	em1	fe8
10.	00:50:56	em1	10.
10.	00:50:56	em1	fe8
10.	00:0c:29	em1	10.
10.	00:0c:29	em1	fe8
10.	00:0c:29	em1	10.
10.	00:0c:29	em1	fe8
10.	00:0c:29	em1	10.
10.	00:0c:29	em1	fe8
10.	00:50:56	em1	10.


SOC Automation

Easing the task of baselining

Automation Overview



- Running minor, repetitive tasks
- Allows teams freedom to study data
 - Data Collection
 - Aggregation




- Scripts to find badness
 - This is what SIEM's do!
- Scripts making decisions for us
 - “This machine fell outside baseline, I’ll automatically ban it”

Where do you put your data?

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Data Collection




stack overflow




Querying Data

- Jupyter Notebook or R to automate studies
 - Programming heavy
 - Steeper learning curve
- ELK for querying
 - May take longer to set up
 - Large community support



Docker

- Public Docker for simple ELK stacks exist
- Require configuring data inputs (more involved)
- Seamlessly integrate OSQuery into Logstash using Filebeat (part of ELK)
- Easy-to-follow guide: <https://elk-docker.readthedocs.io/>



Filebeat

- Log forwarding service, part of ELK stack
- Has built-in templates for transforming OSQuery data into an easily-digestible format.
- OSQuery also has built in support for pushing to LogStash




Configuring OSQuery for Scheduled Queries

```
{
  "options": {
    "host_identifier": "hostname",
    "schedule_splay_percent": 10
  },
  "schedule": {
    "arp_cache": {
      "query": "SELECT * FROM arp_cache;",
      "interval": 10
    }
  }
}
```

Next Steps


- Forward OSQuery (using Filebeat) to Logstash, start hunting with Kibana



Threat Hunting

Tying it all together


Using Statistical Analysis for Threat Hunting



Analyzing Data

In [6]:

```
sns.set(style="white", palette="muted", color_codes=True)
f, axes = plt.subplots(1, 1, figsize=(7, 7), sharex=True)
sns.despine(left=True)
sns.distplot(cs, hist=False, color="g", kde_kws={"shade": True})
plt.setp(axes, yticks=[])
plt.tight_layout()
```




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Hunting Methodologies

- Back to the basics: Now time to look for the abnormal
- Search across environments for behavior and static IOC's
- Least prevalent occurrences tend to be most abnormal



MAC Addresses – Uncommon Environment OUIs

10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	52:54:00	RealtekU	Realtek (UpTech? also reported)
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.
10	00:50:56	Vmware	VMware Inc.

OSQuery Hunting


```
osquery> SELECT name, pid, path, start_time FROM processes;
```

name	pid	path	start_time
systemd	1	/usr/lib/systemd/systemd	0
rcu_sched	10		0
migration/18	100		0
udisksd	1002	/usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd	15
ksoftirqd/18	101		0
systemd-logind	1024	/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logind	16
gssproxy	1025	/usr/sbin/gssproxy	16
irqbalance	1026	/usr/sbin/irqbalance	16
smartd	1028	/usr/sbin/smartd	16
kworker/18:0H	103		0
lsmd	1032	/usr/bin/lsmd	16
watchdog/19	104		0
alsactl	1040	/usr/sbin/alsactl	16
migration/19	105		0
kworker/23:2	10555		17627181
ksoftirqd/19	106		0
mcelog	1068	/usr/sbin/mcelog	17
kworker/19:0H	108		0
kworker/16:2	10880		17627184
watchdog/20	109		0

OSQuery Hunting

```
SELECT name FROM processes WHERE start_time < 100;
```

```
7189 csrss.exe
7189 lsass.exe
7189 conhost.exe
...
2348 dllhost.exe
103 firstboot.cmd
45 FlashPlayerUpdateService.exe
8 psexesvc.exe
3 rundll1.exe
1 conhost.exe
```



Prevalence of Executables

- Can you:
 - Identify abnormal software running on fewest endpoints?
 - Identify executables that are widespread but in unusual places?
- Yes!
 - Extract data on binaries from osquery
 - Combine into CSVs and perform text magic



Filtering Data

- Expressions to hunt for unusual indicators
 - Files that have a single character filename:
\\.\....,
 - Files running one-folder deep from volume root:
(:\\[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,12}\\.\\[a-zA-Z0-9]*\\....,)
 - Files run directly from Windows folder:
(:\\windows\\.\\{1,15},)
 - Files with unusual extensions:
(\\.bin,\\.dat,\\.log,\\.gif,\\.txt,\\.jpg,\\.rar,\\.sql,)




Mass Searching

- One-character file names:



```
6 c:\tdm-gcc-64_4.9.2\work\a.exe
1 c:\accbk\agusta\y.bat
1 c:\users\jsmith\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet
files\Content.IE5\4unu162n\..exe
1 sysvol\users\z9service\downloads\q.exe
1 sysvol\program files (x86)\k2 for sharepoint 2013\z.bat
```

- Low prevalence in Windows Folder

```
22 c:\windows\psexesvc.exe
1 c:\windows\system32\oem\firstboot.cmd
1 sysvol\windows\system32\dsget.exe
1 c:\windows\system32\hpbpro.exe
1 c:\windows\system32\scardsvr.exe
```



A Story of Two Executables (PLink)





Happy Hunting!

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