

# Threat Detection based on Deep Learning at Scale

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
*Siemens Cyber Defense Center*

# Cyber Defense Center

## Globally distributed Team

### Mission

- Monitoring of Siemens infrastructure worldwide
- Identify and analyze security threats



# Cyber Defense Center

**Mission: Threat Detection**

## Log Collection


(Endpoints, Servers, Proxies, AD, Packet Captures, Sandboxes, Email Servers...)

**Store, Enrich, Alert**


**Analyze, Verify, Hunt**



**Siemens Corporate Network**  
(500,000+ Hosts, 350,000+ Users)




**Hybrid Cloud Solution**  
(50,000+ Events/Sec)



**Security Analysts**

# Cyber Defense Center

## Main Detection Components



# AI and Deep Learning on the Rise

High expectations due to success stories

**SIEMENS**  
*Ingenuity for life*



Self-driving Cars



Translation



Cancer Detection

# AI and Deep Learning on the Rise

## How about Security?



Dedicated Workshops



Large amount of new Papers




Numerous (Open Source)  
Tools and Implementations

# AI and Deep Learning on the Rise

## Key Challenges (in Large Environments):

→ Huge gap between research and practice



Limited Generalizability




Limited Scalability



Accuracy (TPs, FPs etc)



No Standard Architectures



Not enough (labeled) Data



Technical Challenges

# Use Case: DGA Detection




# What is a DGA doing?

1

**Malware:** attempt to communicate with Attackers' server



Infected Host



[www.lamEvil.com](http://www.lamEvil.com)


# What is a DGA doing?

2


**Defenses Up: blacklist stops the communication**



Infected Host



Blacklist



[www.lamEvil.com](http://www.lamEvil.com)


# What is a DGA doing?

3

## DGA in action



Infected Host




 [www.lamEvil-0001.com](http://www.lamEvil-0001.com)  
 [www.lamEvil-0002.com](http://www.lamEvil-0002.com)  
 [www.lamEvil-0003.com](http://www.lamEvil-0003.com)

# What is a DGA doing?

**Simply blocking domains does not scale anymore**



Infected host



 [www.lamEvil-0001.com](http://www.lamEvil-0001.com)  
 [www.lamEvil-0002.com](http://www.lamEvil-0002.com)  
 [www.lamEvil-0003.com](http://www.lamEvil-0003.com)

# A Simple DGA Example

```
2 def generate_domain(year, month, day):
3     """Generates a domain name for the given date."""
4     domain = ""
5
6     for i in range(16):
7         year = ((year ^ 8 * year) >> 11) ^ ((year & 0xFFFFFFFF0) << 17)
8         month = ((month ^ 4 * month) >> 25) ^ 16 * (month & 0xFFFFFFFF8)
9         day = ((day ^ (day << 13)) >> 19) ^ ((day & 0xFFFFFFF0) << 12)
10        domain += chr(((year ^ month ^ day) % 25) + 97)
11
12    return domain + ".com"
```

```
print(generate_domain(2019, 5, 7))
print(generate_domain(2019, 6, 19))
```



```
konsbolyfadifehn.com
myycvfoqtcpbbypd.com
```

[CryptoLocker DGA]

# Quiz: Can you distinguish Legitimate Domains from Malicious ones?

xjpakmdcfuqe.nl

edkowalczyk.com

abcdefghijklmnop2223.com

skhhtcss.edu.hk reqblcsh.net

b9qmjjys3z.com

watdoejijbijbrand.nl

oqjiwef12egre6erg6qwefg312qrgqretg132.com

blkdmnds.com

lkckclckl1i1i.com

kdnlrklb.com

cilavocofer.eu

hzmksreiuojy.in

llanfairpwllgwyngyllgogerychwyrndrobwll-llantysiliogogoch.com

# Quiz: Can you distinguish Legitimate Domains from Malicious ones?

xjpakmdcfuqe.nl



edkowalczyk.com

abcdefghijklmnop2223.com

skhhtcss.edu.hk reqblcsh.net



b9qmjjys3z.com



watdoejijbijbrand.nl

oqjiwef12egre6erg6qwefg312qrgqretg132.com



blkdmnds.com

lkckclckl1i1i.com



kdnlrklb.com

cilavocofer.eu

hzmksreiuojy.in



llanfairpwllgwyngyllgogerychwyrndrobwll-llantysiliogogoch.com



= malicious




# Name of a town in Wales




# Detecting DGAs with Deep Learners

# Detecting DGAs with AI



1. Characters are converted to ASCII tokens
2. Tokens are embedded into multi-dimensional vectors
3. Forward layers or Recurrent layers can be utilized to generate features
4. Fully connected layers can be used to increase the model depth
5. A suspiciousness score is assigned based on the output of sigmoid output neuron or softmax layer

# Example CNN Layer with UMAP



domain	label
simonettecaleigh.net	1
kimberleedonaldson.net	1
savingdrivetechnology.com	2
durforcogivprasufor.ru	3
kokkoku-anime.com	normal-traffic
personpermitmountain.com	2



# Results

## Deep Learning Approach

Accuracy (%)	TPR (%)	FPR (%)	TNR (%)	FNR (%)
98.64	98.08	0.77	99.23	1.02

## Shallow Learner Approach (

Accuracy (%)	TPR (%)	FPR (%)	TNR (%)	FNR (%)
84.36	96.78	31.56	68.43	3.21



# Design Platform and Operationalize

# Operational Challenge

**500,000+ Hosts**

**50,000+ Events per second**

**6+ TBs of data per day**

**24/7 Operations**

**Highly Volatile Loads (20x)**

# Operationalize Smart!

**500,000+ Hosts**  
**50,000+ Events per second**  
**6+ TBs of data per day**  
**24/7 Operations**  
**Highly Volatile Loads (20x)**

**Don't burden your team with**

**Auto Scaling (Elasticity)**

**Auto Failover**

**Server Patching**

**Backups**


**Go Serverless**

# Important Pipelines

## Ingest and Inference

1

### Ingest Pipeline: Store AD- Proxy- Email-Logs into the S3






# Important Pipelines

## Ingest and Inference

2

## ETL: Cleaning and Transforming Data




# Important Pipelines

## Ingest and Inference

3

### Presentation: Create Statistics, Provide Data to Analysts




# Important Pipelines

## Ingest and Inference

4

### Detection: Real Time Prediction of Threats




# Important Pipelines

## Ingest and Inference


4

### Detection: Real Time Prediction of Threats




# Important Pipelines


## AI Model Generation and Deployment



# Important Pipelines

## AI Feedback Loop



 **Gate:** requires human approval

**Thank You**