



# FMC

## (Fixed Mobile Convergence)

### What About Security?

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# Agenda

- Introduction - FMC?
- WIFI-SIP overview
- UMA overview
- Femtocell overview
- iWLAN Architecture
- Security?

*"Technology overview ( not FTGroup network strategy )"*

# WiFi-SIP, UMA, FMC...

- New needs – new offers
  - Simplify the current situation (PSTN, GSM, VoIP phones at home !!)
  - Use of a single phone (wireless)
    - At home and on the road
  - Enhance quality / coverage at home
    - WiFi: Use your own A.P. at home – improve cellular coverage
    - Handover GSM/WIFI?
  - Higher data rate -> new services?
  - Lowers communication costs (at least from the customer point of view)
    - Good for ARPU and market shares
  - One phone = increase reachability
  
- Different technologies are available
  - WiFi-SIP
  - UMA (GAN)
  - Femtocell / picocell
  - Others...

# FMC?

- Fixed to Mobile Convergence
- First tests: Denmark, 1997 – PSTN/GSM
  - Single number, one messaging system
  - No handover
  
- First “real” offers in 2005 – UMA based
  - BT with “Fusion”, Bluetooth based at its beginning
  
- In France, “emergence” of FMC?
  - After Triple play offers, quadruple play is becoming the standard...
    - Twin / beautifulphone (Dual phone GSM/WiFi SIP?) by n9uf Cegetel
    - Free phone (GSM/WiFi SIP)
    - Unik (GSM/UMA, Orange)

# FMC (2/2)

- Real FMC possible with WiFi wide adoption
  
- Low-power WiFi chips
  - Phone (and WiFi) needs to be always on

# Other “technologies” exist...

- More or less in use
- Don't provide handover
  
- Bluetooth VoIP
  - Bluetooth dongle (Siemens)
  
- Dedicated WiFi phone
  - Netgear Skype WiFi Phone
    - Netgear SPH101
  - Other partnerships between pure internet players and manufacturers
  
- SIM reader on fixed phone (to import contact list!)



# Wi-Fi SIP


(Session Initiation protocol)

# SIP: Intro

- Internet World
  - SIP is an IETF standard (2002)
  - SIP provides signaling
  - Voice transport relies on RTP
  
- WiFi-SIP very similar to genuine VoIP-SIP
- On the terminal
  - SIP and RTP stack: signaling and stream
  - Add IP and WIFI stack
  - This is a WiFi SIP-phone
  
- **SIP: just add another application on your Wi-Fi terminal**
  - Disjoined from GSM access
  - No handover (except with GSM “private extensions”)



# Wi-Fi SIP Overview



# SIP Security

## ■ Authentication

- At best id and password (http digest)
- Strong authentication is possible but not mandatory (read: not used...)
  - Need to be supported by terminals and servers

## ■ Confidentiality

- Usually: Clear text... (RTP...)
- It is possible to use SRTP (and SIP TLS) but...
- Therefore relies on Wi-Fi security (critical path)

## ■ Strong lack of security functionalities

- Does low cost means lack of functionalities?
- Sip design & security (IETF way...)

## ■ **Wi-Fi security is then critical**

- WEP only? ☹


# UMA

(Unlicensed Mobile Access)


# UMA: Intro

- From the telco world
  - UMA Consortium (Alcatel, BT, Cingular, Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, Nortel, RIM, Siemens, Sony Ericsson, etc.)
  - UMA not a standard, but specifications pushed into 3GPP (GAN)
- Provides an alternative access to 2G/3G services
  
- On the terminal
  - IPsec stack: to reach the UMA platform
  - UMA stack: GSM packet encapsulation in IP (includes RTP...)
  - And of course IP+WiFi stack
  - SIM (USIM) for crypto (authentication, encryption...)
  
- **UMA: alternative access to GSM network**
  - Full access (Voice, GPRS, SMS...)


<http://www.umatechnology.org/>



# UMA Overview



# UMA Functional Architecture



# UMA Security

## ■ Authentication

- Authentication relies on the SIM/USIM
  - IKEv2 and EAP-SIM / EAP-AKA (mutual) + X509 (server side)
  - Then genuine GSM authentication (A3/A8)

## ■ Encryption

- Wi-Fi security for domestic link
- IPsec between terminal and UNC
- Warning: NULL encryption possible on IPsec link




# Femtocell

# Principles

- Femtocells are low-power wireless access points that operate in licensed spectrum to connect standard mobile devices to a mobile operator's network using residential DSL or cable broadband connections (cf femtoforum.org)
- New way to connect to 2G/3G network
- Increase telco. coverage
- IP connection to core network
- Any 2G/3G handset supported

# Femtocell Architecture (3G)




# Femtocell Security


- No standardization yet (Work in progress)
  - Femtoforum, 3GPP...
- Authentication
  - User and/or network authentication rely on the SIM/USIM
    - Genuine GSM/UMTS world...
  - What about the \*cell authentication? Usim?
- Encryption
  - Idem, genuine GSM/UMTS functionalities
- Questions: Iub+ / A/Gb interfaces?
  - BSC/RNC connected to the internet?
  - IPsec on Iub+ link?
- Security of customer's RNC (thee \*cell) is the key point

# iWLAN

# I-WLAN Architecture



# I-WLAN Security



- Security similar to UMA
- PDG located in a different place than in 3GPP architecture (PDG in the core network)

# I-Wlan Issues

- For now, data only services
- IPsec gateway on internet
  - Attacks always possible
- Specific attacks on IKE v2, EAP-xxx... fuzzing for example
- When the user is connected, access only to Wi interface
  - Almost identical to genuine GPRS access
  - Core network should not be reachable
- But the technology still looks quite immature



# Problems, security issues?

# Quick Analysis

- Not exhaustive
- New technology... stay tuned for more information
- Implementation proprietary
  - GAN conformity still to be confirmed
  - SIP: relies on provider implementation / architectural choices
  - Cell: also relies on provider implementation and tech choices
  - I-WLAN: lack of standardization

# WiFi AP...

- First thing: needs for a Wi-Fi access point
  - Open, WEP, WPA?
  - WiFi always on?
  
- This might have strong impact on your security
  
- Corporate case: deploy or reuse existing Wi-Fi network
  - Mix voice and data on the same network?
  - With uncontrolled internet access ?

# Authentication (SIP, EAP...)

## ■ SIP authentication

- May rely on clear text ☹ or HTTP digest
- MD5 is not particularly “on the rise”...
- Brute force attack is feasible on low entropy passwords
  - 40 Millions MD5 per second on a Bi-Xeon (mdcrack)
  - More than 100M on well chosen hard (PS3...)

## ■ EAP-AKA or EAP-SIM authentication

- Looks quite healthy
- Tamper resistant hardware is definitively a plus

# General comments

- Exposing Telco core network?
  - Fuzzer anyone?
  - This might be the next big threat
- Sensible devices are located at customer premises?
- Handling and locating emergency calls?
- Towards new frauds?
- Impact on customer network
  - QoS on shared network...
  - Power outage...



# Questions?

Thanks for your attention



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