


Part 3

Windows Memory Forensics



Peter Haag
Adrian Leuenberger

Memory Forensics



Memory Forensics





Memory Forensics

Agenda:

- Live Forensics
- The Theory
- Data Acquisition
- Data Analysis
- HandsOn/Practice

Theory ... Again ...






Memory Forensics

Live/Memory Forensics


- Makes data available, residing in memory which will get lost when power is switched off. (Volatile Forensics)
- Often used in incident handling, if malware is involved.
- Does not replace traditional disk forensics, but complements the methods to understand the state of a PC.
- Can be difficult as we find ourselves in an untrusted or hostile environment.
⇒ Open heart surgery.
- Finally may or may not result in a full traditional disk forensic analysis depending on the findings.
- Legal aspects: Observe the law.

- Data Lifespan



Memory Forensics

*Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle:
If you know where a particle is you can't measure its speed with precision (and vice versa) without altering it!*




$$\Delta E \cdot \Delta t \geq \frac{h}{4\pi}$$

*Forensic analysis dilemma:
Tools run in memory!
Any attempt to capture data precisely will most likely alter it!*



Best Practice: Collection of data in the “order of volatility”

- 2002: RFC 3227
Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving
- 2004: Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema
Forensic Discovery
- 2006: NIST Special Publication 800-86
Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response





Memory Forensics

What is the proper order of volatility?

RFC 3227

- Registers, cache
- Network status
- Process information
- **Main memory**
- Temporary file systems
- Disk
- Remote logging and monitoring data that is relevant to the system in question
- Physical configuration, network topology
- Archival media

Forensic Discovery

- Registers, peripheral memory, caches, etc.
- **Main memory**
- Network status
- Process information
- Disk
- Floppies, backup media, etc.
- CD-ROMs, printouts, etc.

NIST SP 800-86

- Network status
- Login sessions
- **Main memory**
- Process information
- Open files
- Network configuration
- Operating system time

The basic recipe to collect live information:

- Make notes about everything which you think is important.
- Note the date and time when you start.
- Take a picture of the screen if possible. (Mobile - or Digicams)
- Take a memory image. e.g. windd.(Volatile information first)
- Run some information gathering apps such as
 - SysInternals Process Explorer
 - SysInternals Autorun
 - Winaudit
- Optionally copy suspect files and the Registry Files to a USB stick.
- Run additional AV scanner / Rootkit detectors such as
 - F-Secure Blacklight
 - GMER
- Secunia PSI (online or installed)
- Put all collected data on RO media (e.g. DVD)
- Do the memory image analysis offline.



Memory Forensics

Acquiring the memory image

- In theory there are several possibilities to acquire memory data:

| Software | Hardware |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Affects CPU, memory, kernel and drivers.• Costs mainly driven by license.• Easy to deploy and maintain in a corporate environment; remotely accessible.• Can easily be fooled: “The one who installs earlier/hooks deeper, wins.” | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Low effect on CPU.• Usually requires extra hardware, FireWire may be an exception.• Installation may require significant time (more costs) and local access.• Trusted access to memory? Rutkowska attack on DMA |

Memory Forensics

Caveats:

- Some tools may require admin privileges to install and would need to reboot.
- Hardware devices are often impractical to attach (except firewire)
- Some tools have an overlarge memory footprint, tampers with evidence.

“Blurred” versus “crisp” memory image:





Memory Forensics

Wishful thinking:

“crisp” memory images without tampering with anything

*In theory - yes - but ...
... often difficult to achieve*



Memory Forensics

- Software to acquire a memory image:
 - Plenty of tools available. Most for \$\$
 - Easy for VMware:
Suspend VM, then copy .vmem image file. ⇒ Done.
Suitable only for “planned” tasks.
Malware may potentially detect virtual machines.
 - kntdd by George Garner
<http://www.gmgsystemsinc.com/knttools/>
 - F-Response
<http://www.f-response.com/>
Enables access to physical memory over iSCSI
 - MoonSols Windows Memory Toolkit by Mathieu Suiche:
<http://www.moonsols.com/products/>
win32dd (win64dd) Community (free) and Professional version
Supports Microsoft Windows on 32bit and 64bit platform



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Memory Forensic

win32dd (win64dd) out of MoonSols Toolkit

The Swiss army knife for memory acquisition:

- Easy to use
- Produces images in either raw or **crashdump** formats
- Blurred and crisp memory images
- Three different methods to map memory
- Three hash functions: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256
- Enables hibernate mode, forces crash (atomicity!)
- Can transfer memory image over network
- Works for XP, Vista and Win7 x86, x86_64



Memory Forensics

win32dd options:

```
Usage: win32dd [options]

Option      Description
-----
/f <file>   File destination.

/r          Create a Raw memory dump file. (default)

/d          Create a Microsoft memory crash dump file. (WinDbg compliant, XP and later only)

/c <value>  Memory content.
            0 - Full physical address space.
            1 - Memory manager physical memory block. (default)
            2 - Memory manager physical memory block + Very First PFNs.

/m <value>  Mapping method for either /d or /r option.
            0 - MmMapIoSpace().
            1 - \\Device\\PhysicalMemory.
            2 - PFN Mapping. (default)

/e          Create a Microsoft hibernation file. (local only, reboot)

/k          Create a Microsoft memory crash dump file (BSOD).
            (local only, reboot)

/s <value>  Hash function to use. (Only on sender/local machine)
            0 - No hashing algorithm. (default)
            1 - SHA1 algorithm.
            2 - MD5 algorithm.
            3 - SHA-256 algorithm.

/y <value>  Speed level.
            0 - Normal.
            1 - Fast.
            2 - Sonic.
            3 - Hyper sonic. (default)

/t <addr>   Remote host or address IP.
/p <port>   Port, can be used with both /t and /l options. (default: 1337)

/l          Server mode to receive memory dump remotely.

/a          Answer "yes" to all questions. Must be used for piped-report.

/?          Display this help.

Samples:
win32dd /d /f physmem.dmp           - Standard Microsoft crash dump.

win32dd /m 0 /r /f F:\physmem.bin   - Raw dump using MmMapIoSpace() method.

win32dd /l /f F:\msuiche.bin        - Waiting for a local connexion on port 1337.
win32dd /t sample.foo.com /d /c 0   - Send remotely a Microsoft full crash dump.



win32dd /d /f \\smb_server\remote.dmp - Send remotely on a SMB server.
```

Memory Forensics

XP crash dump:

- Although win32dd supports crash dumps out of the box make sure you have full dumps enabled: (Default is minidumps only)


Control Panel ⇒ System Properties



Memory Forensics

Win7 crash dump:

- Crashdumps
Control Panel ⇒ System and Security ⇒ System





Memory Forensics

Summary crash dumps:

- Crash dumps result in crisp images
- Depending on
 - Windows version: XP, Win7
 - Architecture: x86, x86_64
 - Memory 2GB > size > 2GBcomplete memory dumps may or may not be available.
- Mind to proper settings in the appropriate control panel section.
- See <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/254649> for details.



Memory Forensics

Break

More Theory ...






Memory Forensics

- More on Windows crash dumps:
Force a crash dump (blue screen) from the keyboard:
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff545499%28VS.85%29.aspx>

Enable crash Dumps in Registry:
 - For PS2 Keyboards:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\i8042prt\Parameters`
Create a named value:
`CrashOnCtrlScroll` as REG_DWORD and set it to 0x01
 - For USB keyboards:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\kbdhid\Parameters`
Create a named value:
`CrashOnCtrlScroll` as REG_DWORD and set it to 0x01
- On keyboard: Right Control + twice “SCROLL lock” forces a crash and dumps memory to disk: Either as minidump (default) as full dump.

Memory Forensics

- Dump memory image over firewire:
It's a feature - not a bug!




Dump memory image over firewire and thunderbolt:

Advantage:

- No memory tampering

Disadvantage

- Only the first 4GB of memory are mapped.
- Special tools required.
<http://md.hudora.de/presentations/#firewire-pacsec>
<http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/16>
- <http://www.breaknenter.org/projects/inception/>
- <http://www.breaknenter.org/2012/02/adventures-with-daisy-in-thunderbolt-dma-land-hacking-macs-through-the-thunderbolt-interface/>
- .. and more firewire tools



Hands On Exercise





Memory Forensics

Use the tools presented to collect data from your system:

- Use WinAudit to get an overview of the system
- Collect process information
- Use Secunia Personal Software Inspector (PSI)
- Run some scanners
- Draw first conclusions from your findings



Memory Forensics

Analysing the memory image - bits and bytes:

- Oldie but Goldie: strings
- scalpel: A frugal, high performance file carver
<http://www.digitalforensicssolutions.com/Scalpel/>
- chntpw: Registry analysis
<http://pogostick.net/~pnh/ntpasswd/>
- volatility
<https://www.volatilesystems.com/default/volatility>
- KnTTools by GMG Systems (commercial)
<http://gmgsystemsinc.com/fau/>

Hands On Exercise






Memory Forensics

The screenshot displays a Windows XP desktop environment with several windows open:

- Command Prompt (C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe):** Shows the output of a memory dump operation. The file type is 'Raw memory dump file', and the destination path is 'f:\physmem.dump'. The O.S. version is 'Microsoft Windows XP Professional Service Pack (build 2600)'. The dump is complete, with a file size of 1073741824 bytes (1024 Mb) and an acquisition time of 5:07 minutes and 307 seconds.
- XP Security - Unregistered Version:** A prominent red alert window titled 'System security ALERT!' with a warning icon. It states 'Vulnerabilities found' and 'Your system was scanned for security breaches. Attention: 18 serious issues were detected.' It offers to 'Upgrade to full version of XP Security security software package now!' and provides buttons for 'Activate XP Security' and 'Stay unprotected'.
- Malware Scan Window:** Shows a scan process at 56% completion. It reports 'Infections found: 18' and includes a 'Remove All' button.
- XP Security ALERT (smaller):** A smaller alert window titled 'System integrity threat!' with a warning icon. It states 'Warning! Sensitive data may be sent over your internet connection right now!' and includes a 'Details' section.
- Small Yellow Alert:** A small yellow alert window titled 'Your computer is infected!' with a red 'X' icon. It states 'Windows has detected spyware infection!' and 'It is recommended to use special antispysware tools to prevent data loss. Windows will now download and install the most up-to-date antispysware for you.' It includes a 'Click here to protect your computer from spyware!' link.

The taskbar at the bottom shows the Start button, 'LineWire 5', and several instances of 'XP Security - Un...' along with other system icons and the time '1:51 PM'.

Memory Forensics





Memory Forensics

- The System or VMware image provided, contains everything.
- Working with the tools:
 - strings/grep
 - scalpel
 - reged
 - Volatility
- Use the prepared memory image available at

[Exercises/images/MEMORY-IMG2.DMP](#)

Situation:

You have a memory image taken from a laptop, which was suspected to be involved in a serious e-banking incident. It is to be assumed that some malware could be on it. You suspect it could be either Zeus or Gozi, as these two malware families are currently active in your country. You have two papers available describing these malware families.

Make yourself familiar with the malware families and what characteristics they have and how they can potentially be recognised.

It's now your job to find out what could have happened.

- A memory image from the PC was drawn and is stored on the VMware image*
- The registry was dumped too and is also available for investigation.*



Memory Forensics

First, we apply good old strings and grep to the memory image to extract ASCII data.

- Try to find answers for the following questions:
 - What information can be found?
 - Which applications were running?
 - Which URLs can be identified?
 - What was the user doing, just before drawing the image?
 - Are there indications for any malware?
 - What conclusions can be drawn?
- Commands, which may help:

```
$ cd Exercises
$ strings images/MEMORY-IMG2.DMP
$ grep 'http://\/' strings.txt > http.txt
$ grep 'https://\/' strings.txt > https.txt
$ grep 'c:\\\ ' strings.txt > paths.txt
```

Memory Forensics





- Until now we have processed more or less easily recognisable data. We still have more questions:
 - Which processes were running?
 - Which network connections existed at that time?
 - Again: Is there any evidence for malware?
 - Again: What conclusions can be drawn?

More Theory ...




Virtual / Physical memory

- Physical memory is divided into so-called “pages”.
- Allocated virtual memory is mapped onto physical memory page by page.



Virtual / Physical memory



The same page of physical memory can appear at different locations within the same address space or in different address spaces.



Memory Forensics

Virtual / Physical memory


Data can be moved from physical memory into a page file to clear some space.




Memory Forensics

Virtual / Physical memory

Data can be moved from physical memory into a page file to clear some space.



Memory Forensics



As an example: IA 32 address architecture.
 (Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual, Vol. 3A)
 IA 64 is even more complex.



Memory Forensics

Volatility:

- Is the open source memory forensics framework for incident response and malware analysis.
- Is written in Python.
- Has many optional plugins
- Has a large community.
- Should run on any platform where Python is supported. Volatility has been tested on the following platforms:
 - Linux
 - Cygwin
 - Windows
 - OSX 10.5
- Supports Win XP, Vista, Win7



Memory Forensics

Volatility:

- The Volatility Framework currently provides the following extraction capabilities and more for memory samples:
 - Image date and time
 - Running processes
 - Open network sockets
 - Open network connections
 - DLLs loaded for each process
 - Open files for each process
 - Open registry handles for each process
 - A process' addressable memory
 - OS kernel modules
 - Mapping physical offsets to virtual addresses (strings to process)
 - Virtual Address Descriptor information
 - Scanning examples: processes, threads, sockets, connections, modules
 - Extract executables from memory samples
 - Transparently supports a variety of sample formats (ie, Crash dump, Hibernation, DD)
 - Automated conversion between formats

Hands On Exercise





Memory Forensics

Volatility:

```
$ vol.py -f images/MEMORY-IMG2.DMP imageinfo
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.0
Determining profile based on KDBG search...

Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP3x86, WinXPSP2x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)
AS Layer1 : JKIA32PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2 : WindowsCrashDumpSpace32 (Exercises/images/MEMORY-IMG2.DMP)
AS Layer3 : FileAddressSpace (Exercises/images/MEMORY-IMG2.DMP)
PAE type : No PAE
DTB : 0x39000
KDBG : 0x8054cde0L
KPCR : 0xffdff000L
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdff000L
Image date and time : 2010-05-05 11:54:02
Image local date and time : 2010-05-05 11:54:02
Number of Processors : 1
Image Type : Service Pack 3
```



Memory Forensics

```
$ vol.py -f images/MEMORY-IMG2.DMP pslist
```

```
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.0
```

| Offset | Name | PID | PPID | PDB | Time created | Time exited |
|------------|----------------|------|------|------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0x01de9020 | iexplore.exe | 2836 | 1532 | 0x17232000 | 2010-05-05 11:41:11 | |
| 0x01df38b0 | NC.EXE | 4008 | 3936 | 0x120ff000 | 2010-05-05 11:35:48 | |
| 0x01dfcda0 | ipconfig.exe | 1784 | 312 | 0x1f480000 | 2010-05-05 11:42:11 | 2010-05-05 11:42:13 |
| 0x01efa020 | cmd.exe | 3936 | 1532 | 0x154ff000 | 2010-05-05 11:35:29 | |
| 0x01f20978 | svchost.exe | 956 | 636 | 0x0fc59000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:03 | |
| 0x01f2bb10 | svchost.exe | 1224 | 636 | 0x11177000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:06 | |
| 0x01f3d140 | netstat.exe | 2300 | 2220 | 0x059ed000 | 2010-05-05 11:52:55 | 2010-05-05 11:53:02 |
| 0x01f492c0 | winlogon.exe | 588 | 500 | 0x0ee63000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:01 | |
| 0x01f52020 | lsass.exe | 656 | 588 | 0x0f026000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:01 | |
| 0x01f53020 | svchost.exe | 816 | 636 | 0x0f640000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:02 | |
| 0x01f632a0 | svchost.exe | 872 | 636 | 0x0f913000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:03 | |
| 0x01f87da0 | explorer.exe | 1532 | 1388 | 0x115a8000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:07 | |
| 0x020e5658 | spoolsv.exe | 1460 | 636 | 0x1133f000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:07 | |
| 0x021242b0 | bittorrent.exe | 296 | 1532 | 0x13432000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:17 | |
| 0x02129530 | AcroRd32.exe | 2912 | 1532 | 0x0c4ec000 | 2010-05-05 11:40:25 | |
| 0x0212c900 | realplay.exe | 1852 | 1532 | 0x12c96000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:15 | |
| 0x0212e368 | jusched.exe | 1796 | 1532 | 0x12b29000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:15 | |
| 0x02131658 | jqs.exe | 188 | 636 | 0x132fa000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:16 | |
| .. | | | | | | |
| 0x02236020 | alg.exe | 2104 | 636 | 0x17bf9000 | 2010-05-05 11:25:30 | |
| 0x02265b28 | cmd.exe | 1244 | 4008 | 0x122d8000 | 2010-05-05 11:36:56 | |
| 0x02276628 | csrss.exe | 564 | 500 | 0x0d6ae000 | 2010-05-05 11:24:59 | |
| 0x022a56f8 | WINWORD.EXE | 3028 | 1532 | 0x02d27000 | 2010-05-05 11:40:39 | |
| 0x02300838 | wuauclt.exe | 2952 | 956 | 0x00388000 | 2010-05-05 11:26:30 | |
| 0x023ca830 | System | 4 | 0 | 0x00039000 | | |



Memory Forensics

Working with volatility:

- Use the different volatility commands in order to get interesting information out of the image:
pslist, psscan, connections, connscan, filescan etc.
- Can you answer all remaining questions?



Memory Forensics

Searching for more information: Diving into the registry

The registry is a rich source of all sorts of information. Therefore it's also a good place to search for hints.

`reged` is a powerful tool running on *NIXes to navigate within the Windows registry files. You can *search, change, add, delete and even dump* specific parts of the registry.



Memory Forensics

```
$ reged -e NTUSER.DAT
reged version 0.1 080526, (c) Petter N Hagen
Hive <NTUSER.DAT> name (from header): < Settings\Peter Haag\ntuser.dat>
ROOT KEY at offset: 0x001020 * Subkey indexing type is: 666c <lf>
Page at 0x10b000 is not 'hbin', assuming file contains garbage at end
File size 1310720 [140000] bytes, containing 143 pages (+ 1 headerpage)
Used for data: 11873/1049416 blocks/bytes, unused: 479/35544 blocks/bytes.
```


Simple registry editor. ? for help.

> ?

Simple registry editor:

```
hive [<n>]           - list loaded hives or switch to hive numer n
cd <key>            - change current key
ls | dir [<key>]     - show subkeys & values,
cat | type <value>  - show key value
dump <value> [<file>] - dump key value to file. default file: <value>
hex <value>         - hexdump of value data
ck [<keyname>]      - Show keys class data, if it has any
nk <keyname>        - add key
dk <keyname>        - delete key (must be empty)
ed <value>          - Edit value
nv <type#> <valuenam> - Add value
dv <valuenam>       - Delete value
delallv            - Delete all values in current key
rdel <keyname>      - Recursively delete key & subkeys
ek <filename> <prefix> <keyname> - export key to <filename> (Windows .reg file format)
debug              - enter buffer hexeditor
st [<hexaddr>]     - debug function: show struct info
q                  - quit
```

Memory Forensics





Memory Forensics

Regedt


- Make yourself familiar with reged
- Based on the finding and conclusions, search for maybe relevant keys in this case.
 - Search for suspected keys.
 - Can you confirm what you suspected?

And finally ...



- The glory details:
- Adobe Reader 8.0
 - Document: Waldameisen: Grundlagen und forstliche Massnahmen.
- MS Word:
 - Document: Bekämpfung von Obstbauschädlingen.
- Internet Explorer
 - URL: www.tagesanzeiger.ch
 - URL: www.raiffeisen.ch (eBanking)
 - URL: www.gmail.com
Account piotr.oscarovitch@gmail.com
Password Ru\$\$1@RU
- Limewire, searching for Photoshop
- Infected with Gozi
- Remote controlled: hidden netcat with cmd.exe attached.

Memory Forensics



Memory Forensics





Memory Forensics

Links

- Process Explorer, Autorun
<http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/default.aspx>
- WinAudit
<http://www.pxserver.com/WinAudit.htm>
- F-Secure Blacklight
http://www.f-secure.com/en_EMEA/security/tools/blacklight/
- GMER
<http://www.gmer.net/>
- Secunia PSI
http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/online/?task=intro
- Andreas Schusters Forensics Blog
<http://computer.forensikblog.de/en/>
Many thanks to my colleague Andreas for using part of his materials!!