



Internet Threat Detection System Using Bayesian Estimation

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Agenda

- About project and system
 - Goal
 - Background history
 - System overview
- Threat detection method using Bayesian estimation
 - Mathematical method
 - Example (ftp case), Evaluation, Real action
- www.clscan.org
 - Web site demo
- Conclusion
- On going project

This project is ...

- Kind of academic and voluntary based research project

National Laboratory (1)	National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Japan
Universities (2)	Osaka University. Gunma University.
Private Companies (3)	Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc HIRONOBU SUZUKI OFFICE One private company

Goals




- Find “**new**” threats without human resources
- System never sleep, 24 hours/7 days
- Find threats from huge chaos data
- Show the simple conclusion
- Access the report in anytime from anywhere

Background History

- **1999** CLSCAN (common log scanner)
 - “pretty print” tool for syslog file of my Internet router
- **2001** Last 12 months log was analyzed
 - *“Internet security analysis using packet filter log”*, SEA software symposium 2001
- **2002** WCLSCAN project was started
 - Wide area version of clscan
- **2003** Internet Weather Report aka WCLSCAN
 - “threat calculation using Bayesian estimation” unit was added to WCLSCAN
- **Today**, 4 sensor boxes have been running and provide information on www.clscan.org


System Overview

WCLSCAN



Threat Detection Method using Bayesian Estimation

WCLSCAN



Prio prob. Likelihood

$$P(s_i|r) = \frac{P(s_i)P(r|s_i)}{\sum_j P(s_j)P(r|s_j)}$$

Posterio prob. Evidence

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} S_0 : \text{critical state} \\ S_1 : \text{safe state} \end{array} \right.$

r . Difference between frequency
of port scans and their trends

Likelihood function:


$$\left\{ \begin{array}{lcl} P(r|s_0) & = & \frac{r}{k\sigma_r + r} \\ P(r|s_1) & = & \frac{k\sigma_r}{k\sigma_r + r} \end{array} \right.$$

k : coefficient of sensitivity

Example (ftp case)

- ftp case is a typical example to show how the threat levels are output by our system.
- There are appropriate amount of scans to ftp port.
- ftp case illustrate well the transition of threat levels
- We show how is the alert messages of our system like.


Example (ftp case) 2001-05-15~2002-05-16 (one year)



Example (ftp case)

YYYY-MM-DD

2001-05-15~2002-05-16 (one year)



Example (ftp case) 2001-05-15~2002-05-16 (one year)

Port No.: 21

Warning Level: Severe (Level 2)

Bayes Confidence: 0.8741

Latest Access Amount: 105

Latest Moving Average: 57.2

Latest Standard Deviation: 27.8

**(Latest Term: [Tue May 14 00:00:00 2002
-- Sun May 19 00:00:00 2002])**


Evaluation by ROC Analysis

- **R**eceiver **O**perating **C**haracteristic **A**nalysis
- We apply ROC analysis which is a well-known evaluation method for signal detection
- We evaluate both false-positive and true-positive performance of our threat detection system


Evaluation by ROC Analysis

- Target Data: 2003-01-01 . 2003-12-01
- Relevant alerts during this period (JPCERT):
 - 2003-01-27, port1434(sql), MS SQL server 2000 scans (JPCERT-AT-2003-01-27)
 - 2003-03-18, Port80(http), MS IIS 5.0 vulnerability(JPCERT-AT-2003-0003)
 - 2003-03-31, port25(smtp), sendmail vulnerability (JPCERT-AT-2003-0004)
 - 2003-08-15, port135(rpc), Windows RPC scans (JPCERT-AT-2003-0006)


Time-Series Frequency Graph




Time-Series Threat Level Graph



Distribution of Threat Levels (port 25)



ROC (receiver operating characteristics) Curve



Port 25

Performance is
very good!

Parameters:

ID	Coeff. Bayesian Update	Bayesian Update Period	Trend Interval	Az Value
T301B5k0.5	0.5	5	301	0.95
T100B5k0.5	0.5	5	100	0.79
T100B3k0.5	0.5	3	100	0.8

Our Real Action using IWR aka WCLSCAN

- Case Study 1
 - Doomjuice case
 - Type of Zero-day attack
- Case Study 2
 - SSL BOMB
 - Type of announcement effect attack

Case Study 1: Doomjuice


2004-02-07 1pm: We found port 3127, 1080 and 3128

2004-02-07 4pm: IWR mailing-list “Scanning for Mydoom’s backdoor is increasing”.

2004-02-09 : Virus benders announced about “Doomjuice”.

2004-02-11 : National Police Agency issued alert document.


Case of Zero-day attack



Time Zone is JST

Case Study 2: SSL BOMB

Case of announcement's effect



- SSL BOMB, MS-IIS DoS Attack
 - 2004-04-13 MS04-011 was issued
 - 2004-04-19 Netcraft reported exploit code
 - 2004-04-24 IWR listed it as level 3

How to access WCLSCAN page (but in Japanese)

- Web Brower from PC/PDA
 - www.clscan.org
- I-mode (NTT DoCoMo)
 - www.clscan.org/iwr/i.html
- EZweb (KDDI)
 - www.clscan.org/iwr/ez.html

2004/2/19 19:31
IWR:
L P B C
1 80 0.88 117
1 135 0.84 287
2 901 0.69 9
2 443 0.50 2
3 1080 0.50 128
3 3128 0.49 130
3 12345 0.45 4
3 3127 0.42 209

*Over 68 millions
“Keitai Denwa
(mobile phones)”
can access this
page.*



- L: Alert level, P : port number, B : Bayesian estimation, C : packets count

Conclusion

- We developed Internet threats detection system using Bayesian estimation, IWR aka WCLSCAN
- IWR automatically detects Internet threats and reports them
- IWR service is available 24hours/7days
- IWR performance is good
- IWR provides information for KEITAI-DENWA (smart phone) browser

On going project

- Release source codes as Free Software
 - But all messages and documents are written in Japanese
- Visual analysis
 - 3D animation
- More sensor boxes
- Improve estimation method
- Etc. etc...

WCLSCAN

ご静聴有りがたう御座ゐました