
# SEMI-AUTOMATED CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE (ACT) Workshop - FIRST Conference 2018

Martin Eian and Fredrik Borg

Goal


# To collect and organize our knowledge of threats to make it useful

# Data and Information





# Knowledge



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- Semi-Automated...
- Analysis
- Enrichment
- Information Sharing
- Countermeasures

# Semi-Automated Cyber Threat Intelligence (ACT)

The main objective of the research project is to develop a platform for cyber threat intelligence to uncover cyberattacks, cyber espionage and sabotage.

The project will result in new methods for data enrichment and data analysis to enable identification of threat agents, their motives, resources and attack methodologies.

In addition, the project will develop new methods, work processes and mechanisms for the generation and distribution of threat intelligence and countermeasures, to stop ongoing and prevent future attacks.













# Data Model

- Objects
  - -Global
  - -Example: IP address
- Facts
  - -Connected to a single object or multiple objects
  - -Immutable
  - -Timestamped
  - -Owner
  - -Role-based and explicit access control
  - -Backed by evidence and comments

Fact type	Cardinality	Source object type(s)	Destination object type(s)	
DNSAAAARecord	2	fqdn	ipv6	
DNSARecord	2	fqdn	ipv4	
DNSCNameRecord	2	fqdn	fqdn	
externalLink	2			
geoCountry	2	1 of {ipv4, ipv6}	location	
hasTitle	1	N/A	report	
incidentName	2			
isSinkhole	1	1 of {ipv4, ipv6}	N/A	
isTool	2	hash	tool	
observation	2			
relation	2			
seenIn	2	1 of {hash,domain,ipv4,ipv6,industry,location,threatActor,tool}	report	
targets	2			
threatActorAlias	2	threatActor	threatActor	
threatActorLocation	2	threatActor	location	
threatActorMember	2	person	threatActor	
threatActorType	2			
toolAlias	2	tool	tool	
usedBy	2			
usedInCampaign	2	1 of {hash,domain,ipv4,ipv6,tool}	campaign	
usesC2FQDN	2	hash	fqdn	
usesC2IPV4	2	hash	ipv4	
usesTechnique	2	threatActor	technique	
usesTool	2	threatActor	tool	



# Models, Taxonomies and Vocabularies

- •MITRE ATT&CK
  - https://attack.mitre.org
- •MITRE PRE-ATT&CK
  - https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/
- MISP galaxy
  - https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy
- •STIX 2.0 vocabularies
  - https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/
- Ryan Stillions' DML model
  - http://ryanstillions.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-dml-model 21.html

### ATT&CK Matrix

The MITRE ATT&CK Matrix \*\* is an overview of the tactics and techniques described in the ATT&CK model. It visually aligns individual techniques under the tactics in which they can be applied. Some techniques span more than one tactic because they can be used for different purposes.

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Account Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Command-Line Interface	Automated Collection	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Appinit DLLs	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Application Window Discovery	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Execution through API	Clipboard Data	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Basic Input/Output System	Bypass User Account Control	Code Signing	Credential Manipulation	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Graphical User Interface	Data Staged	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy
Bootkit	DLL Injection	Component Firmware	Credentials in Files	Local Network Configuration Discovery	Pass the Hash	InstallUtil	Data from Local System	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Change Default File Association	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Component Object Model Hijacking	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Local Network Connections Discovery	Pass the Ticket	PowerShell	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Component Firmware	Exploitation of Vulnerability	DLL Injection	Input Capture	Network Service Scanning	Remote Desktop Protocol	Process Hollowing	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Obfuscation
Component Object Model Hijacking	Legitimate Credentials	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Network Sniffing	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote File Copy	Regsvcs/Regasm	Email Collection	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Fallback Channels
DLL Search Order Hijacking	Local Port Monitor	DLL Side-Loading	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote Services	Regsvr32	Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Multi-Stage Channels
Hypervisor	New Service	Disabling Security Tools		Process Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Rundli32	Screen Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Multiband Communication




## Current OSINT Sources

- APTNotes
  - -https://github.com/aptnotes/data
- •APT & CyberCriminal Campaign Collection
  - -https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT CyberCriminal Campagin Collections
- •RSS Feeds
  - -Infosec blogs
- mnemonic PassiveDNS
  - -https://passivedns.mnemonic.no/
- VirusTotal

# THE ACT PLATFORM

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# Platform Architecture Version 0.01



# ■ Platform Architecture – Core technologies













# ■ Platform Architecture – Workflow orchestration

- Originally developed by NSA
- •Open sourced and transferred to the Apache Foundation in 2014
- •Manage flows of data supporting a large number of inputs and outputs:
  - -HTTP, FTP, SCP, Kafka, Elasticsearch, JMS, Syslog, MongoDB, Hadoop, Cassandra, SMTP, POP3, etc









# Platform Architecture – Graph database

- •Looked into existing graph databases, but they lacked proper fine granular permissions (and many of them had commercial licenses that could not be used in the research project)
- •Apache Tinkerpop implemented on top of Cassandra/Elasticsearch
- •Graph queries opens up a range of possibilites that is not possible on a flat data structure











# API - Swagger

experimental	Show/Hide   List Operations   Expand Operations
POST /V1/fact	Create a new Fact.
GET /v1/fact/uuid/{fact}/access	Retrieve a Fact's ACL.
POST /v1/fact/uuid/{fact}/access/{subject}	Grant a Subject access to a Fact.
GET /v1/fact/uuid/{fact}/comments	Retrieve a Fact's comments.
POST /v1/fact/uuid/{fact}/comments	Add a comment to a Fact.
POST /v1/fact/uuid/{fact}/retract	Retract an existing Fact.
GET /v1/fact/uuid/{id}	Retrieve a Fact by its UUID.
POST /v1/factType	Create a new FactType.
GET /v1/factType	List available FactTypes.
РUT /v1/factType/uuid/{id}	Update an existing FactType.
GET /v1/factType/uuid/{id}	Retrieve a FactType by its UUID.
GET /v1/object/{type}/{value}	Retrieve an Object by its type and value.
POST /v1/object/{type}/{value}/facts	Retrieve Facts bound to a specific Object.
POST /v1/object/{type}/{value}/traverse	Traverse the Object/Fact graph starting at an Object identified by its type and value.
POST /v1/object/search	Search for Objects.
POST /v1/object/traverse	Traverse the Object/Fact graph after performing an Object search.
GET /v1/object/uuid/{id}	Retrieve an Object by its UUID.
POST /v1/object/uuid/{id}/facts	Retrieve Facts bound to a specific Object.
POST /v1/object/uuid/{id}/traverse	Traverse the Object/Fact graph starting at an Object identified by its UUID.
GET /v1/objectType	List available ObjectTypes.
POST /v1/objectType	Create a new ObjectType.



# ■API – Python library (act-api on pypi)

### **Navigation**

■ Project description

Release history

▲ Download files

### **Project links**

Homepage

### **Statistics**

View statistics for this project via Libraries.io, or by using Google BigQuery

### Meta

License: ISC License (ISCL) (MIT)

Author: mnemonic AS

ACT, mnemonic

### **Project description**

### python-act

python-act is a library used to connect to the ACT platform.

The platform has a REST api, and the goal of this library is to expose all functionality in the API.

### **Objects and Facts**

The act platform is built on two basic types, the object and fact.

Objects are universal elements that can be referenced uniquely by its value. An example of an object can be an IP address.

Facts are assertions or obsersvations that ties objects together. A fact may or may not have a value desribing further the fact.

Facts can be linked on or more objects. Below, the seenIn fact is linked to both an ipv4 object and report object, but the hasTitle fact is only linked to a report.

Object type	Object value	Fact type	Fact value	Object type	Object value
ipv4	127.0.0.1	seenIn	report	report	cbc80bb5c0c0f8944bf73()
report	cbc80bb5c0c0f8944bf73()	hasTitle	Threat Intel Summary	n/a	n/a



# ■Threat Intelligence Platform - Summary

### Implemented

- -Core platform
- -API
- -GUI
- -Workflow orchestration
- -Graph queries

### •Github project


- -https://github.com/mnemonic-no/act-platform
- -License: ISC (BSD compatible)

### Python API wrapper

-https://pypi.org/project/act-api/


# WORKSHOP - INTRODUCTION mnemonic

# Before We Start






# Introduction 1






# Introduction 1 − Right Click / Left Click






# Introduction 1 − History, Layouts and Filtering





# Introduction 1 − Fact Types





Introduction 2

Try the following object queries and explore the graph:

•threatActor: Sofacy

technique: Credential Dumping

•tool: foosace

•hash: da2a657dc69d7320f2ffc87013f257ad


Task 1

Try the following object query:

•ipv4: 40.112.210[.]240

What is the role of this IP address? Find any related Threat Actor(s).

# ■ Introduction 3 – Threat Actor Aliases





Task 2

Try the following object queries in sequence:


- •ipv4: 85.25.100[.]104 expand reports
- •ipv4: 74.201.40[.]28
- •ipv4: 74.201.40[.]32

What are the roles of these IP addresses? Find any related Threat Actors.

Task 3: Find the Report

https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html

# Introduction 4 − Create/Retract Fact






Bonus Task:

Investigate the domain name rannd[.]org.

# WORKSHOP – GRAPH QUERIES


With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility

# Graph Query 1






# Graph Query 2 – Show Edges






# Graph Query 3 − 2 hops






# Graph Query 4 – Filter Edges (Facts)






# Graph Query 5 – Filter Nodes (Objects)





# Graph Query 6 – Warp Speed






# Task 4: Find the Report

The fqdn fsw.adobeus[.]com is seen in one report. A sinkhole IPv4 address is also seen in the same report. What is the title of the other report mentioning that sinkhole IPv4 address?


Hint: Fact Type 'seenIn'

# Task 4 Solution






g.outE('seenIn').otherV().inE('seenIn').otherV().hasLabel('ipv4') .where(outE('isSinkhole')).outE('seenIn').otherV().path().unfold()





# Graph Query 7 – Unique Tool Usage





# EXERCISES

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#### Exercises

There are two Threat Actors known to use certutil.exe. Which other tool do they have in common?

Which Threat Actor is associated with the domain name www.eye-watch[.]in?

How many DNSRecord facts are connected to the IP address 8.8.8.8?

How many Threat Actors are known to originate (sourceGeography) from France (location)?

How many of the Threat Actors known to originate from Russia use the tool psexec?

#### **Exercises - Answers**

There are two Threat Actors known to use certutil.exe. Which other tool do they have in common?

#### mimikatz

Which Threat Actor is associated with the domain name www.eye-watch[.]in? **Lazarus Group** 

How many DNSRecord facts are connected to the IP address 8.8.8.8? **18741** 

How many Threat Actors are known to originate (sourceGeography) from France?

1

How many of the Threat Actors known to originate from Russia use the tool psexec?

# FURTHER WORK mnemonic

#### New Information Sources

- Security alerts
- Incidents
- Reputation lists
- •Malware analysis systems
- •WHOIS
- •MISP feeds
- STIX feeds

•

Graph Analytics

- •Post. doc. @ UiO
- •Post. doc. @ NTNU

- Information Sharing
- Mechanism for sharing schema
- •Format (STIX?)
- Trust models

#### Trust and Confidence

- Trust (source)
- Confidence (fact)
- Subjective Logic (quantify uncertainty)

### GUI Improvements

- Context menu
  - -Pre-defined graph queries
  - -Download report

-...

- Timelines
- •Share workspace
- •Prune graph

